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Beyond Actual Bias: A Fuller Approach to an Impartiality in School
Exclusion Cases
John M. Malutinok'
"Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law
has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness."
-Justice Hugo W. Black2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Arthur Newsome, a sixteen-year old junior, was accused of selling marijuana cigarettes on
the grounds of his Ohio high school. 3 When the school principal confronted him, Newsome denied
the accusations, asking the principal on what grounds he was being accused. 4 The principal
explained to Newsome that two students had informed the principal of Newsome's conduct, and
refused to identify the students by name.5 Three days later, the Batavia High School notified
Newsome and his family that he would be suspended for ten days. 6
Eight days after Newsome was notified of his suspension, Newsome and his mother were
present at the initial hearing. The superintendent of Newsome's school district presided and heard
testimony from the principal about the interviews with Newsome's unnamed accusers. The
principal testified about his investigation of the matter in support of his decision to suspend
Newsome. 7 Newsome's juvenile court officer also testified, recommending that Newsome be
immediately placed back in school because a urinalysis had tested negative for drug use.' At the
conclusion of the hearing, the superintendent and the principal retreated together to deliberate in a
private session, from which Newsome and his mother were excluded, to "discuss the disposition
of the case." 9
Later that day, the superintendent informed Newsome and his mother of the final decision:
Newsome would be granted a clean disciplinary record upon his acceptance of transfer to a local
alternative disciplinary school.1 0 Should Newsome refuse, he would be expelled-a much stronger
penalty than the original ten-day suspension that he was appealing." When Newsome refused to

' Current law clerk to federal judge. J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 2016. Former Student Chief Editor,
Education Law & Policy Review. Former President, Education Law Students Association. Former middle school
language arts teacher. The author extends sincerest gratitude to Hillel Y. Levin-innovative scholar, engaging teacher,
and invaluable mentor-for his tireless recommendations, revisions, input, and encouragement.
2 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
3 Newsome v. Batavia, 842 F.2d 920, 921 (6th Cir. 1988).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6

Id.

7 id.

'Newsome, 842 F.2d at 921.
9 Id.
10

Id.

" Id.
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take the superintendent's proffer, he was expelled for the remainder of the fall term. 12 Newsome
appealed for a second hearing before the local board of education. 13
At Newsome's second hearing before the board, the principal and school superintendent
acted as adverse parties in testifying against Newsome. 14 Both advocated in support of the decision
the superintendent had made at the initial hearing with input from the principal's investigation of
the matter. 15 Newsome's attorney, who was also present at the board's hearing, requested
permission to cross-examine the principal and superintendent. 16 This request was denied. 17
At the conclusion of this hearing, the school board deliberated in an executive session, a
private meeting from which members of the public are excluded.1 8 No parties from Newsome's
side of the case were permitted to participate in the executive session. 19 Though adverse parties,
and not adjudicators, the principal and superintendent were permitted to join in the school board
session while the board deliberated about the evidence presented at the hearing. 20 Agreeing with
the principal and superintendent's findings below, the board affirmed the expulsion, holding that
Newsome was not permitted back at Batavia High School until late January of the following year. 2 1
The progression of Arthur Newsome's case through various levels of the student
disciplinary process illustrates how the composition of a disciplinary tribunal can have profound
impacts on the outcome of that student's case. The facts in Newsome's case present some major
concerns regarding the impartiality of those adjudicating his hearings, especially when Newsome's
situation is analogized to a traditional criminal courtroom setting. At the superintendent's hearing,
12

Newsome, 842 F.2d at 921.

13 Id.
14 Id. at 922.

1 Id. at 921-22.
1
6 id.
17

The school board's denial of Newsome's right to confront and cross-examine the students who testified against him

was upheld by the Circuit Court. Id. at 926. Though beyond the scope of this article, the inability to cross-examine
students and administrators testifying against the student facing school exclusion raises its own due process issues.
See Derek W. Black, The ConstitutionalLimit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REv. 823, 879 (2015); see
generally Brent M. Pattison, Questioning School Discipline: Due Process, Confrontation, and School Discipline
Hearings, 18 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 49 (2008). Courts are divided on whether confrontation and crossexamination are constitutionally required at school discipline hearings. See also Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist.
No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 919-20 (D. Maine 1990) (confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses not required
where student admitted to the misconduct of which he was accused); B.S. ex rel. Schneider v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees,
255 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (student expelled for on-campus sex not entitled to call as witness alleged
partner); John A. v. San Bernardino Unified Sch. Dist., 654 P.2d 242, 251 (Cal. 1982) (finding a due process violation
where a student was expelled without testimony from accusing witnesses); Stone v. Prosser Consol. Sch. Dist. No.
116, 971 P.2d 125, 128 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (finding a violation of due process where a student was kept from
calling a witness at his disciplinary hearing); Colquitt v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 227, 699 N.E.2d 1109, 1116
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (cross-examination of witnesses allowed in school discipline hearing because it is fundamental
element of a fair hearing).
" See, e.g., Trib Total Media, Inc. v. Highlands Sch. Dist., 3 A.3d 695, 697 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010); United Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Gonzalez, 911 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
19
Newsome, 842 F.2d at 922.
20

Id. Newsome prevailed on one issue, which was raised by the superintendent's presence at the school board's

deliberations. Specifically, the superintendent disclosed new evidence to the board during the deliberations that was
not presented at the hearing itself. The court found this violated Newsome's due process right to notice of the charges

and evidence against him. However, as has been cogently pointed out, this served as a "narrow victory" in light of the
impartiality
Newsome was shown throughout the school's disciplinary procedures. See Black, supra note 17, at 856.
21
Newsome, 842 F.2d at 922.
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the principal's involvement with the superintendent-not only during the hearing but also during
private, closed deliberations-is akin to a prosecutor presenting his case before the judge, then
immediately joining the judge in chambers for an exparte review of the hearing and evidence. The
same conduct occurred at Newsome's second hearing on his appeal before the school board, except
that the decision-maker who presided over Newsome's first hearing joined Newsome's adversary
(the principal) in advising the school board and reviewing the evidence in the case. 22 In the judicial
context, such activity would translate to a prosecutor and trial court judge joining a panel of appeals
judges in their deliberations and advising those judges on how to make a determination on the facts
and the evidence presented. Such conduct would be simply unacceptable in judicial contexts.
Newsome raised multiple issues in his appeal to the Sixth Circuit, 23 the most prominent of
which asserted a procedural due process violation due to the lack of an impartial tribunal.2 4 While
conceding that "participation by the investigating administrators in the deliberation process of the
fact-finders is an open invitation for the administrators to bring up evidence of the student's guilt
which had not been disclosed to the student as required by Goss," the court found no violation
from such participation. 25
Cases like Newsome's are not uncommon, and the stakes are high for students in
Newsome's position. 26 The consequences of long-term discipline 27 may include total exclusion
from school, long-term or permanent assignment to an alternative education program, and,
according to studies, a much greater risk of ending up in the juvenile and criminal justice systems.
Unfortunately, the law in this area is largely inadequate to provide students facing disciplinary
charges with the appropriate level of procedural due process. 28
This Note seeks to address the deprivation of due process that occurs when a student's
disciplinary hearing is adjudicated by a tribunal whose impartiality is questionable. In so doing,
this Note points to the inadequacy of the majority approach among lower courts, which requires a
finding of actual bias in its determination of whether a disciplinary tribunal was impartial, thereby
adopting a thin view of what constitutes an impartial tribunal consistent with minimal due process.
This Note also presents a brief survey of disciplinary hearing practices among the states to show
how most state legislation codes have failed to provide substantial, or "thick," impartiality
protections to prevent bias, much like the avenue the majority of federal courts have taken. 2 9 Along
22
23

Newsome, 842 F.2d at 926.
These include the denial of his right to cross-examine witnesses, the denial of his right to an impartial tribunal, and

a24 denial of notice arising out of the tribunal's consideration of evidence not made known to him. Id.
25

See Id.
Id. at 926-27 ("[W]e cannot say that, as a general matter, it is a violation of due process for investigating

administrators to participate in the deliberation process") (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)).

See infra Part II.A.
This Note refers to "long-term discipline" to denote any suspension lasting more than ten days, expulsion, and/or
other removal from mainstream public education. At the outset, it is important to note that disciplinary due process
procedures for students not receiving special education differ substantially from due process provided for special
education students under federal civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Kristy A. Mount, Note, Children 's Mental Health
Disabilitiesand Discipline: Protecting Children's Rights While Maintaining Safe Schools, 3 BARRY L. REV. 103
(2002).
28 See infra Part II.A.
29 This note utilizes the phrases "thick" and "thin" impartiality protections in an effort to both avoid
the vague and oftused "substantial" and "insubstantial" terminology and to offer a more visually demonstrative lexicon for the due
process protections the author proposes. In doing so, the author borrows from E. Thomas Sullivan and Toni M.
Massaro, who coined this terminology in the due process context. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO,
THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 5 (2003) (Borrowing terminology, it can be useful to
26

27
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the way, this Note points to some laudable federal court opinions and state legislative provisions
that provide thicker impartiality protections of the kind this Note proposes.
Finally, this Note presents a new approach that comports more fully with due process to
provide thicker impartiality protections. That approach argues that constitutional due process
requires students facing long-term discipline be provided a hearing officer free from the
appearanceof bias, consistent with Goss' proscription that students be given "fundamentally fair"
procedures. 30 Such a requirement would replace the actual bias standard adopted by most lower
courts. Instead, the approach this Note proposes would require the disqualification of an individual
from acting as decision-maker in a student's disciplinary tribunal whose neutrality may be
questioned because of the individual's role in the student's case or because of influence of others
involved in the student's case. In support, this Note presents actual legislation as normative models
drawn from states that have thick impartiality protections, along with suggested model provisions
for a reformed education code.
II.

THE PROBLEM

Cases like Arthur Newsome's illustrate the difficulties faced by students, families, school
districts, and the attorneys representing them in achieving a fair and impartial tribunal consistent
with due process. This Part seeks to illustrate those difficulties in forging a path to a thicker view
of impartiality by first addressing the rising level of adversarial practices in the school discipline
context, a level that may be at full tide because of its resemblance to litigation rather than the
benign system of cooperative family-administration relationships envisioned by professionals,
judges, and justices of an earlier era, including at least one who decided Goss.3 1 Second, this Part
attempts to resolve the question of why thick impartiality protections are necessary by
demonstrating the high stakes of school exclusion in the well-researched phenomenon of the
school-to-prison pipeline. Third, this Part surveys the lack of uniformity that has led to thin
impartiality safeguards by surveying trends that state legislatures and local districts have taken.
Finally, this Part discusses how the Supreme Court's ground floor case for due process, Goss3 2
does not address the thick impartiality protections due process requires for students facing longterm discipline except for the simple requirement that procedures be "fundamentally fair." 3 3
A. The Adversarial School Discipline Landscape
First, similar to the judicial context, the modern school discipline landscape has become,
at its heart, adversarial.3 4 Though Goss may have imagined an educational atmosphere of benign

think about the procedural and substantive components of rule of law theories existing on a continuum in which a
particular version is "thin" or "thick" in the sense that it may have few or many requirements) (citing Brian Tamanaha,
ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91 (2004)).
30
31
32
33
34

Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
See Black, supra note 17, at 832-35.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 565.
Id. at 574.
See Black, supra note 17, at 846 (emphasizing the increasingly routine nature of adversarial models in school

discipline) (citing JUDITH KAFKA, THE HISTORY OF ZERO TOLERANCE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLING 6 (2011)).

See also David Doty, By the Book: Fullerv. Decatur Public School Boardof Education, District61 and the Essential
Elements of Student Due Process in K-12 Expulsion Proceedings, 151 EDUC. L. REP. 353, 359 (2001); Zachary W.
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give-and-take between administrators and students, 35 severe discipline, such as lengthier
suspensions and lower tolerance for expulsion, has been on the rise for a number of years. 36
According to the U.S. Department of Education, 3.5 million students are suspended in the U.S. per
year. 3 Suspension rates have doubled since the 1970s when Goss was decided. 38 As one
congressman put it, a fight in the schoolyard that at one time would have warranted a visit to the
principal's office, may now lead to exclusion from school and possibly referral to the juvenile
justice system. 39 The use of police, security cameras, and criminal justice methods has contributed
to the increase in adversarial posturing in school discipline controversies. 40 A possible explanation
for the rise in school discipline occurrences is the trend toward zero tolerance policiesdisciplinary provisions that mandate substantial consequences for a varying degree of behavior. 4 1
The vagueness of disciplinary offenses in such policies afford administrators wide discretion,
creating a space for potential racial animus to thrive undetected.4 2
B. The High Stakes of School Exclusion
"The significance of suspension and expulsion has ... grown to the point where they are
more appropriately understood as educational death penalties than as corrective or management
tools." 4 3 Research shows that the stakes are high for students facing long-term suspension or
expulsion, suggesting that the balancing scheme used by the federal courts starts out from an
Best, Note, Derailingthe Schoolhouse-to-JailhouseTrack: Title VI and a New Approach to DisparateImpact Analysis
in Public Education, 99 GEO. L. J. 1671, 1676 (2011) (school suspensions have nearly doubled since the 1970s and
trends show the increasing use of criminal justice tactics in addressing disciplinary issues); see generally Dean Hill
Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School Exclusion, 75 TENN. L. REV. 265 (2008).
35 See Black, supra note 17, at 845 (Goss implicitly assumed a benign relationship between administrators and
students); Larry Bartlett & James McCullagh, Exclusion from the Education Process in the Public Schools: What
Process is Now Due, 1993 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 1, 24 (1993) ("the Court appears to presume ...
that school

disciplinarians will proceed in good faith").
36

See generally Aaron Sussman, Learning in Lockdown: School Police, Race, and the Limits of Law, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 788 (2012); Daniel J. Losen & Tia Elena Martinez, Out of School and Off-Track: The Overuse of Suspensions
in American Middle and High Schools,
THE CIV. RTS.
PROJECT,
8-9
(Apr.
3,
2013),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/federalreports/out-of-school-and-off-track-the-overuse-of-suspensions-in-american-middle-and-high-schools/OutofSchool-

OftTrackUCLA_4-8.pdf (suspension rates have increased at nearly every level, age, and racial group, with
suspension rates among African-American students rising significantly more over time than any other racial group).
37
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Statement from U.S. Dep't of Educ. Sec'y Arne Duncan on Student Discipline
and Civil Rights (Oct. 30, 2015), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-secretaryeducation-arne-duncan-school-discipline-and-civil-rights.
38
See Best, supra note 34, at 1676.
39
Ending the School to PrisonPipeline:Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, 112th Cong. 848, 1, 113 (2012),
available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg86166/pdf/CHRG- 112shrg86166.pdf [hereinafter School
to Prison Pipeline].
40
See Sussman, supra note 36, at 816-17.
41 Daniel J. Losen & Russell J. Skiba, Suspended Education: Urban Middle Schools in Crisis, THE Civ. RTS. PROJECT,
2 (2010), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/school-discipline/suspended-education-urbanmiddle-schools-in-crisis/Suspended-EducationFINAL-2.pdf [hereinafter Urban Middle Schools].
42 Abundant persuasive commentary exists raising problematic issues associated with vague code of conduct
provisions. See, e.g., Best, supra note 34, at 1676; Brooke Grona, Comment, School Discipline: What Processis Due,
What Process is Deserved?, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 233, 241-44 (2000); see generally Jason J. Bach, Students Have
Rights, Too: The Drafting of Student Conduct Codes, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1 (2003).
43 See Black, supra note 17, at 833.
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inaccurate calculation of the risk of an erroneous deprivation for the student. 44 The commentary is
abundant and persistent on the consequences of exclusionary discipline-both suspension and
expulsion-on students' later lives, a phenomenon commonly referred to as the "school-to-prison
pipeline." 45 The overall body of research on the phenomenon has cogently shown that students
excluded from school are more likely to become delinquent, to drop out, and to become involved
with the criminal justice system as incarcerated offenders. 46
For example, according to a leading study, students who were suspended were twice as
likely to be held back and three times as likely to be involved in the juvenile justice system later
in life. 47 Studies also show that students suspended in middle school are particularly subject to
negative long-term consequences. For instance, in one large, Northeastern city, two-thirds of
incarcerated ninth-graders had been suspended at least once in the eighth grade. 4 8 The group had
only attended school-voluntarily or involuntarily (that is, subject to suspension or expulsion)58% of the time on average. 4 9 While a full review of the extensive research connecting school
exclusion to juvenile delinquency and incarceration is beyond the scope of this Note, the
connection points to what is at stake for a student in a school disciplinary hearing, and thus, lends
gravity to the consequences of disciplinary tribunal hearings.
Students facing long-term suspension or expulsion after being found guilty are often
assigned to alternative schools as a preference to total exclusion.5 0 Though assignment to an
alternative education program may at first seem like a more attractive approach for student
placement than complete removal from the educational setting, there is reason to be concerned
about the educational quality of many alternative education programs.5 1 At least some research has
indicated that alternative schools contribute to-rather than mitigate-the school-to-prison
pipeline phenomenon. 52 In 2009, a privately run alternative school in Georgia settled with the
ACLU over claims that its practices deprived students of the fundamental right to basic public
44

See, e.g., C.B. by & Through Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383 (1Ith Cir. 1996).
Christine A. Christle, et. al., Breaking the School to Prison Pipeline: Identifying School Risk and Protective

45 See

Factors

for

Youth

Delinquency,

13

EXCEPTIONALITY

69,

70

(2010),

available

at

http://youthjusticenc.org/download/education-justice/prevention-interventionalternatives/Breaking%20the%2OSchool%20to%20Prison%20Pipeline: %20Identifying%2OSchool%2ORisk%20and
%20Protective%20Factors%20for%20Youth%20Delinquency.pdf
(exclusionary discipline practices such as
suspension and expulsion have been identified by research as key risk factors in juvenile delinquency and antisocial
behavior, which are the end result of the school to prison pipeline); see generally Best, supra note 34.
46 See Christle, supra note 45, at 70 ("[e]xclusionary discipline practices, such as suspension, interfere with the
educational process and perpetuate a failure cycle, decreasing the opportunities to gain academic skills and appropriate

social behaviors").
47
48

See School to Prison Pipeline, supra note 39, at 2.
See Urban Middle Schools, supra note 41, at 3.

49 id.

See TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, POLICY RESEARCH: DISCIPLINARY ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAM
PRACTICES, 1 (2007), available at https://tea.texas.gov/acctres/SpecPRR_17_2007.pdf (providing a brief overview,
50

history, and policy purpose of "DAEPs").

See generally C.A. Lehr & C.M. Lange, Alternative Schools and the Students They Serve: Perceptions of State
Directors of Special Education (2012), https://ici.umn.edu/products/prb/141/) (discussing whether alternative school
curricula offers adequate special education services for student with disabilities).
52
See AUGUSTINA H. REYES, DISCIPLINARY ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN DISCIPLINE, ACHIEVEMENT,
51

AND RACE: IS ZERO-TOLERANCE THE ANSWER?,

47-69 (2006) (many alternative schools operate with a law and order

approach that does not serve as a true alternative to the education provided in public schools from which alternative
school students have been removed); see generallyAlternative Schools and Pushout:Research andAdvocacy Guide,
NESRI (2007), https://www.nesri.org/sites/default/files/%20DSCAlternativeSchoolsGuideFinalSmall.pdf.
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education guaranteed by the state's constitution. 53 Finally, alternative schools may be subject to
fewer accountability requirements than ordinary public schools, which would lend less public
scrutiny to the question of whether they are providing an appropriate public education. 54
Whether the consequence of a disciplinary hearing involves reassignment to an alternative
educational placement or outright removal from the school system, the stakes for a student facing
disciplinary charges at a hearing are very high. The gravity of these consequences undercuts the
argument that disciplinary tribunals do not require the "trial-type procedures" of a criminal
courtroom.5 5 As discussed above, research supports the notion that the potential consequences for

a student facing disciplinary charges can be the loss of a basic education and dramatically increased
chances of both delinquency and incarceration. 56
C. The Lack of Uniformity and Thin Impartiality Protections in State Legislatures
Education is inherently a function of the individual states. 57 Each state legislature sets its
own due process for discipline, unlike due process hearings regarding special education, which are
set by federal legislation.5 8 Because the Supreme Court has not specified due process requirements
for long-term suspensions or expulsions beyond the "some kind of hearing" language in Goss,
states vary widely with how charges involving long-term suspension and expulsion are
adjudicated. 59 This Section presents an overview of some trends state legislatures have taken in
addressing the question of who should constitute a student's disciplinary tribunal or hearing
officer, a choice that indicates the state's own interpretation of the level of impartiality due to
students facing long-term discipline.
As a preliminary matter, this Section first presents the typical models for the investigation
of a disciplinary matter and the subsequent imposition of charges. A discussion of the more
determinative question of who is allowed to adjudicate and be present at disciplinary tribunals
follows.

53

60

It is beyond the scope of this Note to look into the constitutionality of every state

Harriset al. v. Atlanta Independent School System, ACLU (Dec. 18, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/cases/harris-et-al-

v-atlanta-independent- school- system?redirect=racial-j ustice/harris -et- al-v- atlanta-independent-school- system.
54 Evidence for lesser accountability requirements for alternative schools is their lack of requirement to meet or report

Adequate Yearly Progress under No Child Left Behind legislation. See Deborah Gordon Klehr, Addressing the
Unintended Consequences of No Child Left Behind and Zero Tolerance: Better Strategiesfor Safe Schools and

Successful Students, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 585, 595-96 (2010) (noting that relaxed accountability
measures make it "hard for the public to decipher the educational achievements of students in alternative education
programs").
55
Jennings v. Wentzville R-IV Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1118, 1124 (8th Cir. 2005).
56 See Christle, supra note 45; Losen & Martinez, supra note 36; U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 37; Best, supra note
34.
57 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (Education is a state's most important function); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("By and large, public education in our nation is committed to the control of state
and local authorities.").
5 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.500 et seq. (2006) (mandating due process procedures for special education hearings).
59
Goss, 419 U.S. at 579; 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2018).
60 At this juncture it may be helpful to point out that where an individual is present during a disciplinary tribunal who
is not a member of the tribunal, the question becomes one of exparte communications. In other words, what if any ex
parte communications should thick impartiality protections afford? This issue arises frequently with differing
treatment by the lower courts. Compare Newsome, 842 F.2d at 926 (presence of principal and superintendent at closed,
post-hearing deliberations of disciplinary panel did not violate due process) with Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp.
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education code, though helpful resources for such an endeavor certainly exist.61 Instead, this
Section's limited goal is to identify the variety of trends taken by various states with regard to
individuals permitted to adjudicate student disciplinary tribunals in order to determine the kinds
of procedural practices various states permit, regulate, and limit. Finally, this Section normatively
evaluates the variety of trends, concluding that most practices do not fully comport with the thick
impartiality protections this Note proposes.
i. Investigation and Imposition of Charges
In most states, an administrator 62 at the building where the misconduct is alleged to have
occurred serves as an initial investigator of a student's discipline charges. 6 3 The common-sense
reasoning behind this method is that the possession of institutional knowledge by the administrator
will presumably allow her to gather facts most efficiently. The administrator is typically physically
present in the building on a daily basis, and he or she has familiarity with the students and teachers
involved in disciplinary incidents. Just as a detective might be detailed to a certain precinct for
investigating crimes occurring there over a period of time, it seems to make sense that a buildinglevel administrator will handle the function of disciplinary investigations because he or she is
institutionally well-equipped to do so. 64 A further advantage to the general trend in allowing
building-level administrators to conduct disciplinary investigations is that it prevents higher-level
administrators, such as the superintendent or her staff, from being involved in the minutiae of
potentially insignificant or petty disciplinary matters.
In states that allow or require a superintendent to adjudicate initial discipline hearings,
limiting a superintendent's involvement in early fact-finding matters mitigates the concern that the
individual conducting the hearing is serving dual roles or is being affected by bias that may have
arisen during factual investigations. However beneficial the practice of allowing building-level
administrators to maintain an investigative function may be, the practice is mainly a function of
convenience, and not a matter of legislative proscription. 65 Based on the author's review, no state
460, 465 (1977) (presence of superintendent and school board attorney at closed deliberations was a due process
violation).
61 See, e.g., Compendium of School Discipline Laws and Regulationsfor the 50 States, Washington, D.C., and Puerto

Rico, Dep 't ofEduc., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (2013), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/appendix2-compendium-of-laws-and-regulations.pdf.
62
Here, "administrator" is a catch-all term used to designate any professional educator working in a public school
district who is not a teacher. Administrators act as supervisors to teachers and handle disciplinary matters often referred
to them by teachers. See Daniel B. Abrahams, et. al, Sample Job ClassificationSpecifications,Public Employers Guide
to FLSA Employment Classifications 1900, 903 (2015).
63 A building-level administrator would include a principal, vice principal, counselor, or other administrative staff who
handles disciplinary matters within one particular school. See e.g., Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642, 666 (D.
Neb. 1972) ("It is clear that usually the building principals conduct their own investigation, and in nearly all cases,
end up with a confrontation of the student."); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968)
(" [i]t is of course the duty of a school administration to be aware of developments at the school and to attempt to solve
problems as they arise"); see generally Five Key Responsibilities- The School Principalas Leader: Guiding Schools
to Better Teaching and Learning, THE WALLACE FOUND., http://www.wallacefoundation.org/knowledge-

center/school-leadership/effective -principal -leadership/Pages/key-responsibilities -the- school-princip al-as

leader.aspx.
64 See source cited supra note
63.
65 See, e.g., Wilson v. Hinsdale Elem. Sch. Dist. 181, 810 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (permitting
principal
to testify at student's initial hearing with regard to the allegations and student's academic background).
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legislature affirmatively limits the ability of a superintendent to be involved in the investigative
functions of discipline cases should he or she choose to do so.
Most state legislatures specify in their education codes which school official is responsible
for imposing the charges entailing long-term discipline upon the conclusion of an investigation.
At one extreme are the states that allow long-term suspension and expulsion proceedings to be
initiated by building-level administrators, such as the principal.6 6 State legislatures that reserve the
power of assigning long-term suspension or expulsion to the local school board or an external
governing body, such as a state education agency, are at the other end of the extreme. 67 However,
some states opt to allow the superintendent to initiate long-term suspension or expulsions before a
later board hearing. 68 The determination of which administrator orders or recommends the initial
long-term disciplinary consequence is beyond the scope of this Note. However, in jurisdictions
where that administrator is also the adjudicator in the students' cases, this initial question has
ramifications for the level of impartiality the student might receive.
The two extremes with regard to initiation of discipline proceedings can be seen by
contrasting legislatures. Consider, for example, Ohio's requirement that the superintendent, not a
building-level administrator, initiate expulsion proceedings. 69 Ohio permits superintendents to
adjudicate expulsion hearings. 7 0 Though the superintendent's decision may be appealed to the
school board, this appeal may not be as much of a neutral escape hatch for the condemned student
as it first appears, since the superintendent was likely hired directly by the board and works closely
with its members on administrative matters. Under such circumstances, a superintendent might be
conceivably analogized as simultaneously occupying the roles of prosecutor as she investigates
and initiates proceedings, trial court judge as she adjudicates at the initial hearing. In addition, in
her ability to sway the board's decision because of her close working relationship with those
individuals, she may be analogized to the role of an appellate law clerk as she influences the
board's decisional process. Notably, none of the Ohio education code's regulations restrict such
ex parte interactions.71
All state codes proscribe the "some kind of hearing" required by Goss. 7 2 However, states'
laws on who is eligible to be an adjudicator of that hearing vary widely. Following is a brief
discussion of the typical multiple-hearing practice that most school districts employ. The Note
then turns to a review of a broad grouping of state codes that have adopted similar practices with
regard to the adjudication of disciplinary hearings.
ii. Adjudication of Charges and the Multiple Hearing Model
Before surveying the variety state disciplinary hearing practices taken by legislatures, it is
helpful to gain a high-level institutional understanding of the skeletal discipline procedure

66

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-843(D)(2) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-753(a) (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71 §
37H (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS §380.1311 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1134 (2014).
67 See, e.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-B, § 2506.1 (2017) (reserving imposition of long-term suspension and expulsion
to

the District's Chancellor of schools).
68
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3301.121(d)(1) (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-507(c)(d)(1d)(1) (2013).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66(B)(7) (LexisNexis 2016).
Id. § 3301.
71 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (2016).
72
See Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.
69

70
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employed by many states when a student is faced with charges entailing severe discipline. 73 This
procedure involves multiple hearings, with differing degrees of formality, for students who face
long-term suspension or expulsion.7 4 At the first "hearing," the student and his or her parent will
typically meet with the administrator who has investigated the disciplinary infraction, such as the
principal or another building-level official.75 In some cases, the superintendent may be present at
this meeting, and sometimes the superintendent is the sole school official present. Though
legislatures often refer to this initial meeting as a "conference" rather than a "hearing," the meeting
operates as a hearing in most cases, since the decision of whether to suspend or expel is made upon
its conclusion. 76

States vary widely in practices, but the overall trend is to allow a second, more formal
hearing after the initial conference. This is especially common in cases carrying expulsion
consequences.77 Though most legislatures provide for a second level of this formal hearing, that
level may take the form of a second fact-finding hearing during which new evidence may be
presented.7 8 However, another widely held practice is limiting the second level of review to an
appeal before the county board of education, an impartial hearing officer, or an administrative
panel.79
Beyond the initial conference and hearings, many states allow for judicial inquiry, often by
the county trial court.8 0 In such cases, a trial court's review is almost always highly deferential to
the findings and decisions already made by the school. States that allow review of an independent
Not all states follow this multiple-hearing practice. Some state education codes may only proscribe one level of
formalized hearing, though one might safely assume that some kind of conference -style meeting has taken place before
the formalized hearing. See e.g. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48918(a)(3) (2016) (providing for only one hearing directly
before local board).
74
See, e.g., Newsome, 842 F.2d at 148 for a general outline of the typical multiple-hearing process, from an informal
hearing before an administrator overseeing the student's particular school involving only the student and his parents,
7

to a more formal hearing before the superintendent where the student's counsel was present, to a final evidentiary
hearing before the school board, serving as an appeal of the lower hearings. Notably, even at this last hearing, student's
counsel was not permitted to cross-examine administrator-witnesses.
7 See, e.g., Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 627-28 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (finding that due process

required, at a minimum, the "opportunity to be heard," which was satisfied by a meeting with the student and his
parents at which an administrator explained the charges and supporting evidence).
76
See, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 570.
77
See, e.g., Newsome, 842 F.2d at 921; D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-B § 2505(3).
78
See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-B, § 2506.6 (2017) ("The parent or guardian or adult student shall have the opportunity

to present testimony or documentary evidence, including the opportunity to call any witnesses[.]").
79
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48919 (2016) (County board of education, in reviewing the school board's decision based on a
fact-finding hearing, may elect to conduct a supplemental hearing or simply limit its review to an appeal of the record
below). In such cases, this review is often highly deferential to the findings below. See, e.g., Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that Georgia Board of Education will only overturn a school

district's expulsion decision if it finds a "shocking disparity between the offense and penalty"). Elsewhere, Georgia's
Department of Education standard for review of local board decisions is described as articulated as an arbitrary and
capricious standard. See Ransom v. Chattooga Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 242 S.E.2d 374, 376 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).
soSee, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-108(2) (2013).
" See Newsome, 842 F.2d at 149 (conceding a trial court's "temptation to act as a 'super' Board of Education and
make the decision that the Court deems appropriate," in contravention of the reviewing court's responsibility to show
high deference to the decision of the institution below) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 439 U.S. 816 (1979)); Nichols v.
Destefano, 70 P.3d 505, 507 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) ("The district court has the authority to review an action of a board
of education for an abuse of discretion."); Alicia C. Insley, Suspending and Expelling Children from Educational
Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1052 (2001) (courts are highly
deferential to the determinations made by local districts).
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administrative entity may also provide for an appeal in the county trial court, thereby increasing
the level of review independent of those working in the school district. 82
iii. Permitted Decision-Makers at Disciplinary Hearings
Some legislatures have reverted to a laissez-faire approach, delegating the development of
discipline procedures to local boards of education, so long as they are consistent with state and
federal constitutions. 83 In the adjudication realm, this practice permits local boards of education to
make their own decisions with regard to who hears a student's disciplinary case. Other states
delegate all practices to state-level departments of education to establish skeleton regulations, upon
which local boards may develop constitutionally appropriate procedures. 84
Many states allow administrators to preside as adjudicators at discipline hearings. The
permitted administrators may be lower level staff, such as principals, or district-level employees,
like a superintendent.8 5 In states permitting administrators to impose long-term discipline, this
practice is functionally consistent with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of impartiality because it
permits those who impose or recommend the discipline to preside over the decisions they made.
Though some legislatures do so by specific provision, other legislatures simply delegate all hearing
procedures to local districts, requiring only that procedures comply with state and federal
constitutional due process. 86 In such cases, it would be permissible, and likely convenient, for a
local board to delegate the hearing process to a superintendent, but that decision would lie with
the board. Other states provide specifically for district-level staff, such as superintendents or their
designees, to adjudicate disciplinary hearings. 87 In such cases, a common practice is to allow the
superintendent to preside at a due process hearing to establish a factual record, after which one or
more appellate bodies will preside.8 8
In states that afford the student a hearing before the local board, the superintendent's
hearing often precedes the board's hearing. 89 In other states, such as Colorado, the local board is
permitted to delegate its requirement to conduct a hearing to the superintendent subject to a final,
limited review with deference to the factual record developed at the superintendent's hearing and
an opportunity for the board to ask questions of the student and other hearing participants.9 0 In

82

See GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-1160 (2015); Fulton Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. D.R.H., 752 S.E.2d 103, 104 (Ga. Ct. App.
2013); Wis. STAT. § 120.13(l)(c)(3) (2015) (providing for county circuit court review of state superintendent of

education's ruling).
83

ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1(f)(e)(1) (2016); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 07.010 (2016).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-502 (2013).
5 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66(A)(2), (B)(6)(b) (allowing administrator to preside over informal

84

hearings prior to a student's suspension or expulsion).
86

See ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1(f)(3) (2016); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4 § 07.010 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §
701(d) (1953).
87
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3301.121(D) (2016).
"See Moody v. Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. (Ohio Ct. App. 2008); Rucker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 517
A.2d 703, 704 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
89 The discipline procedure Ohio afforded Newsome is an example of this practice. See supra Part I.
90
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-105(2)(c) (2013). Delaware allows the superintendent to hear the initial case to
establish a factual record, after which appeal is allowed to the state board of education, rather than the local board.
See Rucker, 517 A.2d at 705 (holding that "there is no fundamental due process right to a hearing officer who is not
an employee of the school district").
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many instances, the superintendent's hearing is the only fact-finding hearing, and the board's
review of that hearing will be limited to the factual record developed there. 9 1
Some states expressly provide for a hearing before the local board of education. 92 Within
this practice, some provide for an initial hearing before an administrator as detailed above, while
others do not proscribe an initial hearing, providing instead for students faced with long-term
discipline to present their cases directly to the board.93 In states where the only proscribed hearing
is before the local board, the administrator is thereby prevented from serving in any adjudicatory
role. 94 After such a hearing, the local board is generally permitted to conduct private deliberations
from which any non-board members are excluded, 95 though this meeting may be open to
administrators or the district's attorney. 96 Some states allow a student to object to closed
deliberations, forcing the session to be conducted in the student's presence. 9 7 This practice may be
limited by the privacy rights of other students protected by a state's privacy laws. 9 8 Some states
give local boards or superintendents the option of delegating the hearing procedures to independent
hearing officials who are not employees of the district or members of the local board. In these
jurisdictions, the delegation of conducting the hearing is not an affirmative requirement. 99 Rather,
the school board may elect to delegate, but is not affirmatively required to do so. 100
In states where delegation of the formalized fact-finding hearing to independent hearing
officers is permitted, some mandate impartiality requirements on those hearing officers. For
example, Ohio provides that hearing officers may be licensed attorneys, but that no hearing officer
serving as a board's advising attorney may be appointed by that board to hear a case within that
district. 10 1 Connecticut's education code provides that no member of the local board may serve on
the impartial hearing panel. 102 Similarly, California requires that, where larger counties utilize
administrative hearing panels in lieu of the county board of education, those panels must be made
up of individuals who hold a California education certification but are not board members or
employees of the local school district seeking the disciplinary action. 103 Arizona is one of a
collection of states that employs a list of state-approved hearing officers available for local districts
to utilize in discipline hearings, 104 while California permits school districts to draw from a pool of

COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-105(2)(c) (2013).
See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6(b) (1988); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-507(d)(1) (2013) (providing for local
board's review of superintendent's recommendation for long-term discipline).
93
See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6(b) (1988).
94
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(I)-(J) (2013).
95
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-507(d)(2)(A) (2013); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35146 (2016).
96
See Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 263-64 (5th Cir. 1985) (no due process violation where
principal, superintendent, and school board attorney were present at closed-session, post-hearing deliberations).
97 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35146 (2016).
91 See
92

9

8 Id.

99 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-233d(b) (2015).
100

§ 15-843(F)(2)(a)-(b) (2013); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48918(d) (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT.

Id.

101
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3301.121(D)(2) (2016).
102
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233d(b) (2015).
103 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48919.5(a) (2016) (requiring that "an impartial administrative panel" be composed
of "three
or more certificated persons"); See also John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 654 P.2d 242, 244 (Cal.
1982).
1
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(F)(2)(b) (2017).
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hearing officers that preside at other state administrative tribunals in order to conduct a student's
expulsion hearing.10 5

Though some states provide for the option of delegating hearing functions to independent
officials, very few require their use. 106 On the other hand, the District of Columbia's school system
provides for an independent fact-finding hearing using an impartial hearing officer for long-term
suspensions or expulsions. 107 That officer makes a recommendation upon hearing the evidence,
which is then recommended to the Director of the District's Office of Youth Engagement. 108 An
expulsion recommendation by the impartial hearing officer may then be appealed directly to the
District's Chancellor of Education. 109 Throughout the process, the local school district remains an
adversarial party with the burden of proof, and the hearing officer oversees whether due process is
complied with. 110
Some legislatures require local districts to report long-term suspensions or expulsions to a
state entity, such as a state superintendent or department of education.
Such requirements
contemplate the severe nature of school exclusion as a discipline because they ensure against
districts using the tool at an overly frequent level. 112
A handful of states have requirements for how to handle the question of when a suspended
or expelled student may be reinstated early, if the student has met conditions for such
reinstatement. 113 Wisconsin, for example, requires an administrator other than one in the student's
school to make the reinstatement evaluation. 114
iv. State Procedures in Review
A cursory review of state procedures for long-term discipline reveals that the
administration and school board form integral roles in the fact-finding functions imposed by most
state legislatures. Though some states separate the administration officials, such as building-level
administrators and district-level administrators from the fact-finding and adjudicatory function, 115
many states retain at least an option for those entities to play an adjudicatory role in the discipline
105

CAL. EDUC. CODE

106

§§ 48918(d) (2016) (citing CAL. Gov. CODE § 27720 (2018));

CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35207 (2018).
See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48918(d); Rossi v. W. Haven Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 2d 178, 179 (D. Conn.

2005) ("The Board has delegated expulsion decisions to an impartial hearing officer.").
107 D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-B, § 2507.1.
10

§ 2507.3.
§ 2507.9.
110
Id. at §§ 2506.7-2506.9.
s Id. at
1d. at

109

" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 76 § 16 (2014) (the State Board of Primary and Secondary Schools annually reviews
student exclusion days by districts. The code requires that districts who suspend students furnish reasons for the
suspensions to the State Board and provides any student unlawfully excluded with a right of action in tort for damages
against the board of education).
112

The Council of State Government's Justice Center maintains a comprehensive source on student discipline

reporting requirements by state. See Council of State Governments, School DisciplineData:A SnapshotofLegislative
Action (Mar. 14, 2014), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/NCSL-School-Discipline-DataBrief.pdf.
113 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.25(2)(d)(3) (2018).
114 id.

11' See, e.g., D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-B § 2505.1 (providing that medium- and long-term suspensions and expulsions
may be recommended by the principal, but may only be authorized by the Chancellor's office); MINN. STAT. §
121A.47, subd. 6 (2017) (limiting the adjudicatory function of a student's disciplinary hearing to an independent
hearing officer, individual school board member, school board committee, or full school board).
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case. 116 While many states allow the option of utilizing impartial hearing officers, these states are
mostly silent on the role of the superintendent in the board's adjudicatory function, 1 17 and it is
conceivable to envision a high level of advisement and involvement of interested parties, such as
district administrators, in the otherwise "impartial" board's adjudication.1 1 8 In those states, the
impartiality of a given administrator would remain in the hands of the court upon a fact-based
inquiry of an administrator's biased decision-making in the initial discipline process, either in the
adjudicatory role, the personal occurrence of discipline, or both.1 19
Finally, few states have fashioned procedures to separate the functions of adjudication and
investigation. 120 The states that have done so take distinct approaches, but generally require
districts to hire state-level hearing officers to adjudicate the facts of a case, with the review of that
decision either going back to the local board based solely on the record, 12 1 or proceeding to a statelevel education administrator. 122
Unsurprisingly, in response to the low standard for impartiality adopted by the federal court
jurisprudence that will be discussed below, the majority of states do not adequately safeguard
impartiality in the disciplinary process. 123 A few education codes show signs of hope because of
their allowance or affirmative requirement of the use of independent hearing officers in long-term
discipline cases, but most states leave the question of who adjudicates at disciplinary hearings up
to local boards of education. There is a caveat, though, that a local board, and possibly county
court, will be available to review an appeal, albeit with high deference to the factual record. 124
Such practices often leave the trier of fact role to those administrators who have served the
discipline recommendation in the first place, which is problematic for the many reasons
demonstrated above. 125 State legislation must be more robust in protecting impartiality and model
legislation and existing practices employing thicker protections show that this goal is not
unreasonable.

116 See e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416(A)(3)(c) (2017) (providing for student appeal to hearing before parish
superintendent).
117 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 121A.47, subd. 6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(F)(2)(a) (2017).
".See, e.g., Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 465 (noting the district superintendent's presence at the school board's closed
deliberations despite not being permitted to serve an adjudicatory role).
11 9
See, e.g., Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 568 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding principal who imposed
ten-day suspension was racially biased and thus impartial); Riggan v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647,
663 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that the building-level administrator's position as the personal target of a student so
biased the administrator that it should have disqualified him from making a suspension recommendation to the board).
120 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.6(b) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302A-1134(a)
(2014).
121 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.6(b) (2004).
122 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302A-1134(a) (2014).
123 See infra Part III.
1 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-108(2)-(3) (2013); King v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 260
(N.C. 2010).
125 See, e.g., J.M. v. Webster Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 534 S.E.2d 50, 58 (W. Va. 2000) ("If the principal does proceed, at
this 'principal's informal hearing,' the principal is to make a determination by principal determination as to whether
or not the student violated the statute. Thus, the principal becomes the finder of fact at this stage in the process.")
(citing W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-la(a)) (providing for determination of violation by principal subject to review by county
board of education).
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D. The Lack of Supreme Court Guidance: Goss' Sparse Language
Goss represents the starting point of what due process school districts must afford to
students facing disciplinary charges. 126 This case involved several students facing long-term
suspensions arising from various accusations of disruptive conduct at several Ohio junior high and
high schools. 12 7 The opinion reviewed a decision issued by a three-judge panel of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which granted an injunction in the students' favor and
ordered the administrators to expunge the students' records because they were not afforded due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 128 In reviewing the District Court's decision, the Court
established that students facing removal from school on disciplinary grounds are entitled to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 129 The Court reached this conclusion by recognizing
that the removal of a student from school represents the deprivation of a property right-a severe,
rather than de minimis right1 30-in public education conferred by a state's constitution and thus
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. 131 In addition, the Court recognized
a liberty interest in a student's right to be free from the stain of misconduct on his or her permanent
record. 132 Consistent with the constitutional requirement to safeguard these deprivations, Goss
held that schools must provide students with "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case." 1 3 3 The Court briefly defined the required hearing as an "informal give-andtake between student and disciplinarian," with an "opportunity to present [the student's] side of
the story."

134

Significantly, Goss limited the scope of its holding to short-term discipline, entailing a
suspension of ten days or less. 135 For discipline entailing longer-term exclusion from school, the
Court simply stated that "longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term,
or permanently, may require more formal procedures." 136 Because of this limitation and the
absence of any subsequent Supreme Court decisions directly addressing the issue, the question of

126
127

Goss, 419 U.S. at 565.
Id. at 570-71.

Id. at 567.
Id. at 572-73.
130 Id. at 576 (Concluding that the nature of education, not the weight of the exclusion, is the
primary factor in
determining the severity of deprivation: "[T]he total exclusion from the educational process ... is a serious event in
the life of the suspended child"). In determining that the exclusion from education is more than a de minimis
deprivation, the Court hearkened to the Brown court's tenet: "education is perhaps the most important function in state
and local government." Id. (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
131 Id. at 572-73 (where a state confers a right of basic public education and makes attendance compulsory, the state
may not withdraw that right upon a student's alleged misconduct without constitutional safeguards to ensure the
misconduct occurred) (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). The Court
compared the right to receiving public education given by a state to other established rights requiring due process,
such as the continued right to receive welfare benefits. Goss, 419 U.S. at 573 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970)).
132
See Goss, 419 U.S. at 575.
133
Id. at 579 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
128

129

134Id. at 581, 584.
135
136

Id. at 584.
Id. (emphasis added).
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what procedures are required for students facing long-term discipline1 37 remains open. 138 This
vacuum forms a basis for the question this Note seeks to address-namely, what constitutes a fair
and impartial tribunal, consistent with "full and fundamental fairness," 1 3 9 for students facing longterm discipline? 14 0 As this Note discusses below, few commentators have addressed the question
directly, and lower courts vastly disagree when faced with the issue. Similarly, state legislatures
have drafted differing figurations of impartiality into their respective education codes, presenting
a widely varying tapestry of state-by-state legislation on the topic. 14 1
III.

THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT SOLUTIONS

Lower courts have necessarily formulated solutions to the variety of approaches on what
constitutes impartiality, with a majority opting for thin protections. 142 Additionally, commentators
have identified the issue in light of the increasingly adversarial nature of school discipline cases,
and those identifications have in some cases led to academic approaches to the impartiality
question that focus on best practices. 14 3 This Part reviews approaches to impartiality protections
137

For ease of language, the phrase "long-term discipline" is used in this Note to indicate disciplinary consequences

resulting in a student's exclusion from school for more than ten days.

138 See generally Pattison, supra note 17 (addressing the question of whether students facing long-term discipline
are
required to confront and cross-examine witnesses); Dolores J. Cooper, Long-Term Suspensions and Expulsions after
Goss, 57 EDUC. L. REP. 29, 30-34 (supporting the notion that c29 ("Courts have continued to define notice and hearing
requirements after Goss for long-term suspensions); Simone Marie Freeman, Note, Upholding Students'Due Process

Rights: Why Students are in Need of Better Representation at, and Alternatives to, School Suspension Hearings, 45

FAM. CT. REv. 638, 640 (recommending that due process safeguards include entitlement to counsel at discipline
tribunals); Rivkin, supra note 34.
139 Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
140 Though the Court did not specifically require that hearings be impartial, that requirement is of course imported by

the decision's use of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause to address the deprivation it held to be significant.
Id.; Hill v. City of Clovis, 2012 WL 787609, at *8 (E.D. Cal.) ("as expulsion is a significant deprivation, the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause requires inter alia that a student receive an impartial adjudicator for expulsion
proceedings"); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972) (requiring an uninvolved, independent hearing officer
for parole revocation hearings to ensure fair and impartial hearing); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) ("the
right to an impartial decision-maker is required by due process"); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973)
(finding that members of an administrative hearing board who possessed a personal interest in the case should be
disqualified to ensure impartiality, which is a requisite of due process). Prior Supreme Court due process jurisprudence
also emphasizes the long-standing common law requirement of impartiality in ensuring a fair hearing. See, e.g., Arnett,
416 U.S. at 197 ("no man shall be ajudge in his own cause") (quoting Bonham 's Case, 77 ENG. REP. 646, 652 (1610));
Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 ("our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness.... To this end, no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has
an interest in the outcome"); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (requiring an impartial decision-maker for the determination
of welfare benefits-namely, an individual who has not made "the determination under review").
141 See Freeman, supra note 138, at 642 (Goss has left state legislators to decide what process should be afforded, who
have in turn failed to develop adequate procedures or have delegated the development of procedures to local school
districts, resulting in widespread due process violations at the local level); infra Part III.D.
142 See, e.g., Brewer, 779 F.2d at 264; Newsome, 842 F.2d at 921; Lamb v. Panhandle Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 826 F.2d
526, 528 (7th Cir. 1987); Jennings, 397 F.3d at 1124; Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. 812, 817 (W.D. Va. 1977); C.B.
by & Through Breeding, 82 F.3d at 383.
143 See, e.g., Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Comm., 457 A.2d 1368, 1380 (Vt. 1983) (finding that the student
suffered prejudice by the departure from established due process procedures where his parents "determined not to
bring an attorney to the hearing because of their understanding that the hearing would be a 'family-type affair'
without attorneys while the school's attorney was in fact present at the hearing).
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lower courts and legal commentators have adopted, concluding that neither of these adequately
comport with due process. However, a few courts have applied robust impartiality protections
consistent with the thick view of impartiality for which this Note argues.
A. Divisions in the Lower Courts
Because the Goss decision's procedural requirements were limited to short-term
suspensions of ten days or less, lower courts have been left to formulate their own interpretations
of what process is due for students facing long-term discipline. 144 These formulations by necessity
address the question of who is eligible to adjudicate disciplinary hearings to ensure the "more
formal procedures" required by the Court for long-term discipline. 145 Though courts agree that the
formal hearing prescribed by Goss must be impartial to satisfy procedural due process, most courts
interpret that requirement thinly, recognizing a violation only where a student can show actual bias
on the part of the decision-maker presiding at the tribunal. Other circuits employ a more cautious
approach through a thicker definition of "impartial tribunal." 146 These courts presume bias in
certain circumstances in which a hearing officer has served in dual roles and prohibit individuals
from serving as decision-makers who have an appearance of bias even where students have not
demonstrated actual bias. 147
i. The Majority Approach: Thin Impartiality Protections
Most courts employ a thin definition of what constitutes an impartial tribunal required by
Goss. 148 Under this approach, an impartial tribunal may include, or consist solely of, an
administrator who has played other roles in the application of the discipline prior to the hearing. 149
"See Newsome, 842 F.2d at 923 ("Without the aid of Supreme Court authority directly on point, we are left with
resolving the procedural due process issues presented in this appeal under the more general rubric of Matthews v.
Eldridge") (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Aguirre v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist.,
170 Cal. Rptr. 206, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("The question we must decide is whether the additional safeguards

contemplated by [Goss'] phrase 'more formal procedures' include confrontation and cross-examination") (quoting
Goss, 419 U.S. at 584). See also Pattison, supra note 17, at 51 ("Although the Supreme Court has not fully defined
the contours of procedural due process in the context of long-term suspensions or expulsions, it has given lower courts

the tool to do so with the Matthews test").
145

Pattison, supra note 17, at 51. See also Brownv. Univ. of Kansas, 599 F. App'x. 833, 837 (10th Cir. 2015) ("Goss

simply noted that severe disciplinary action could require 'more formal procedures,' not. . . ... the equivalent of a
trial") (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 584); Cooper, supra note 138, at 29 (courts are not in complete agreement as to what
constitutes adequate notice for longer suspensions and expulsions); Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 465 (there is doubt as

to what an "impartial tribunal" means in practice).

See, e.g., Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 465; Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 402 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Supra note 143; see also infra Part III.A.2.
See William G. Buss, ProceduralDue Processfor School Discipline: Probing the ConstitutionalOutline, 119 U.
PA. L. REV. 545, 618 (1971) ("[a] strong case mustbe made to establishpersonal bias. Combinations of functions also
rarely succeeds as a constitutional argument"); Brewer, 779 F.2d at 264; Newsome, 842 F.2d at 921; Lamb, 826 F.2d
at 528; Jennings, 397 F.3d at 1124; Hillman, 436 F. Supp. at 817 (W.D. Va. 1977); C.B. by & Through Breeding, 82
F.3d at 383.
149 Brewer, 779 F.2d at 264 (administrator involved in the initiation and investigation of disciplinary charges is not by
those roles disqualified from operating as an impartial decision-maker at the student's disciplinary hearing); Newsome,
842 F.2d at 927 ("[w]e cannot say that, as a general matter, it is a violation of due process for investigating
administrators to participate in the deliberation process"); John A., 654 P.2d at 247 (no due process violation where
teachers sat on student's tribunal hearing panel because plaintiff showed no evidence of actual bias).
146

147
14 8
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Though many circuits taking this approach differ along subtle lines, what unites them all is their
refusal to find per se impartiality, and thus a due process violation, where an administrator has
served in multiple roles in the student's disciplinary process. 150 The Fifth Circuit approach finds
no due process violation where a decision-maker or advisor to the decision-maker is also: (1) an
employee of the district;15 1 (2) an investigator of the discipline matter or other fact-finder; 152 (3)
an initiator or prosecutor of the charges at issue; 153 (4) an administrator who has recommended the
exclusion to the decision-making body; 154 (4) or a school attorney representing the school
district. 155
Courts that follow the Fifth Circuit's approach provide both practical and legal reasoning
for their reluctance to recognize per se bias in tribunal hearing officers who have played multiple
roles in a student's decision process. 1 5 6 The courts also point to the practice's convenience, noting
that it is far more practical to use school officials who may have been involved in the discipline
and have a working knowledge of the details of the case and the particular student. 157 Further, the
practice of hiring outside, independent hearing officials is a drain on the school's resources as
1 58
those officials-often chosen from a pool of approved local attorneyss
must be compensated
for their time. 159

In addition to the convenience of the practice, courts point to legal distinctions that justify
the thinner view of impartiality employed by the Fifth Circuit approach. 160 Specifically, they
distinguish the disciplinary due process hearing for a student enrolled in public school from
hearings requiring a "full-blown administrative appellate process," finding that less formal hearing
procedures are due in the school discipline context. 16 1 In their view, the provision of an entirely
15

o See Brewer, 779 F.2d at 264; Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1973); Levitt v.
Univ. of Tex., 759 F.2d 1224, 1233 (5th Cir. 1985); Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529.
151 Hillman, 436 F. Supp. at 816.
152 Jennings, 397 F.3d at 1125 (because no personal animus was presented, the administrator could
serve as an
impartial hearing officer even though he investigated details of the case); Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin Sch. Dist., 172
F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1115 (E.D. Wis. 2001) ("absent evidence of particular bias or prejudgment, the same person or

entity may first investigate and later adjudicate whether proscribed conduct occurred").
153 Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529 ("the combination of an advisory function with a hearing participant's prosecutorial or
testimonial function does not create a per se facially unacceptable risk of bias"); Hillman, 436 F. Supp. at 816
(Principal who initiated suspension charges was not thereby disqualified from acting as an impartial hearing officer

without any evidence of principal's actual bias).
154

See Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529; Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (extending Supreme Court interpretation of federal
common law interpreting Administrative Procedure Act to the school discipline setting) (citing Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35 (1975)); Hillman, 436 F. Supp. at 816 (finding no due process violation where a hearing officer had also

prosecuted the student's case over which he presided).
155 See generally Alex v. Allen, 409 F. Supp. 379, 388 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (school board attorney may "prosecute the
case against [the student], rule on evidentiary questions, and advise the board as to possible action").
156
See C.B. by & Through Breeding, 82 F.3d at 388, n. 3.
157Id. ("[i]n the school context, it is both impossible and undesirable for administrators involved in incidents of
misbehavior always to be precluded from acting as decision-makers").
158
See, e.g., Linwood v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763, 765, n. 4 (7th Cir. 1972). The local district in
that case affirmatively chose to develop procedures that mandated an independent review panel made up of three

outside approved attorneys and was not required to do so, consistent with the Seventh Circuit's adoption of the
majority approach. See Lamb, 826 F.2d 526.
159
See e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1988) (providing outside, independent decision-makers

in the education context will involve an "improper allocation of resources," and may be "counter-productive").
160
161

See, e.g., Newsome, 842 F.2d at 921.
See, e.g., Newsome, 842 F.2d at 921.
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independent hearing officer-unassociated with the District, the incident at hand, or both-would
lead to an "undue judicialization" of school discipline cases. 162 Courts following this approach
also draw heavily from administrative law procedures, some of which allow individuals who have
engaged in fact-finding to also serve as adjudicators at a hearing. 163 In doing so, these courts
emphasize that the due process hearing is not meant to be a "judicial or quasi-judicial trial," at
which every precaution must be taken against the appearance of bias.1 64
Though courts taking the Fifth Circuit's approach steer clear of finding a presumption of
bias resulting from a hearing officer's dual roles in the disciplinary process, their approach allows
the student to show actual bias of the hearing officer or a member of the hearing panel, which in
some cases has resulted in a finding of bias that violated due process. 165 The discipline at issue in
Riggan was the result of a student's conduct toward a high school principal. 16 6 The student was
disciplined for photographing the male principal's car in front of the house of a female teacher. 16 7
In that case, the trial court held that because of the personal nature of the student's conduct that
resulted in discipline, the principal should have removed himself from presiding over the student's
disciplinary hearing. 16 8 The court in Riggan articulated surprisingly vigorous language by stating
that due process violations may occur when an administrator is "in any way unable to function
fairly as a trier of fact." 169 Other circuits have similarly found due process violations where a
student was able to prove egregious forms of actual bias on the part of an individual presiding at
her hearing. 170 Thus, in severe cases where the factual scenario allows a plaintiff to show open and
undisguised bias, courts taking the Fifth Circuit approach do not permit administrators to play a
role in the student's adjudication. 171 However, the same courts generally refuse to presume bias in
cases where a decision-maker has been extensively involved in the case, even where the hearing
officer initiated the discipline charges or rendered the initial decision on the discipline being
appealed. 172

162
163

Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15.
Id. (upholding the constitutionality of social security adjudications in which hearing officers are permitted to

operate as investigators who gather facts prior to issuing a decision on a recipient's case) (citing Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389 (1971)).
"Linwood, 463 F.2d at 770 ("[t]he type of administrative hearing here involved need not take

the form of a judicial

or quasi-judicial trial").
165

See, e.g., Riggan v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647 (W.D. Tex. 2000).

166 Id.

at 650-51.

167

Id.
16 8
Riggan, 86 F. Supp. at 657 ("The conduct alleged in this particular situation is of such an obviously personal nature
that any reasonable administrator would have deferred to another uninvolved individual to conduct any investigation
or
to mete out any discipline").
169
Id. at 656 (quoting Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973)).
17 0
Heyne, v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 568 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding a due process violation where
the administrator presiding over the white student's disciplinary, which involved an altercation between that student
and an African-American student, had earlier recommended to staff that African-American students be treated more
leniently in order to maintain racially balanced discipline statistics and had admitted to reducing the African-American
student's discipline for the same incident at the threat of a lawsuit).
171 See Id.
172

See, e.g., C.B. by & Through Breeding, 82 F.3d at 388.
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ii. The Minority Approach: Thick Impartiality Protections
Other courts interpret Goss' requirement of "some kind of hearing" for long-term
disciplinary consequences more substantively, opting for procedures that are meant to prevent an
appearance or "unacceptable risk of bias." 17 3 These courts view impartiality through a different
lens, recognizing that an absence of actual bias may not fully comport with due process, where the
appearance of bias is still present. 174 This approach is not novel to administrative adjudications. 175
However, in the school discipline context, only a few courts take the approach, and these circuits
are often internally inconsistent. 176
Courts favoring a thicker view of impartiality have held that a decision-maker who serves
as the initial recommender of the discipline cannot serve as an impartial decision-maker. 177
Additionally, some of these courts do not permit individuals functioning in prosecutorial or
disciplinary roles to advise the deciding school board or, in some cases, to even be present during
closed deliberations following a hearing. 178 Finally, these courts have found due process violations
where a school district's attorneys both "prosecuted the charges against the [students] in the
expulsion hearings" and provided counsel to the school board members who made the ultimate

See Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 465 (noting that where a district did not employ the use of an unbiased hearing
officer, "it would have been more reasonable to provide procedures that insured not only that justice was done, but
also that it appeared to have been done") (emphasis added).
174 Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 464 ("[t]he question before the court is not whether the Board was actually biased, but
whether, under the circumstances, there existed probability that the decision-maker would be tempted to decide the
issues with partiality to one party or the other") (emphasis added).
175 See, e.g., Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486 (finding presumed bias where a parole officer overseeing an inmate's parole
status serves as a decision-maker at the inmate's parole revocation hearing); Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 (noting that there
are situations where, in the absence of actual evidence of bias on the part of an adjudicator, the risk of bias is intolerably
high, foreclosing the opportunity for an impartial tribunal); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (requiring that the decisionmaker in a welfare benefits review case should not be the individual who recommended the termination of benefits
under review at the hearing); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prisoner's claim that his letter was
wrongfully censored could not be adjudicated by the same officer who censored the letter initially); Gibson v Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (administrative adjudicator with pecuniary interest in case could not impartially adjudicate
dispute even in absence of actual bias); American Cyanimid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966) (Commissioner
who had previously served as counsel for Senate subcommittee investigating company could not serve as impartial
decision-maker at the company's later regulatory hearing); Greenberg v. Bd. of Governors of Federal Reserve System,
968 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the Administrative Procedure Act prohibits agency prosecutors from
serving adjudicatory function in same matter).
176 For instance, where the Central District of California has presumed bias where a decision-maker initiated or
prosecuted a student's charges, the Eastern District has no concerns with the practice, instead requiring "significant
evidence" to overcome a presumption of neutrality on the part of any administrator who serves as decision-maker. See
Hill v. City of Clovis, 2012 WL 787609, at *6, *8 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ("due process is not necessarily violated when the
school official who initiates, investigates, or prosecutes charges against a student plays a role in the decision to suspend
the student") (quoting Heyne, 655 F.3d at 568).
177 Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 465 (Superintendent who served as "chief of the 'prosecution' team" could not have
constitutionally operated as decision-maker).
178
Id. at 465 (Superintendent's presence during board's deliberation after expulsion hearing violated due process
because of risk of bias from superintendent's role as prosecutor of the student's charges).
173
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decision at the disciplinary hearings. 179 This practice can occur frequently.18 0 The courts taking
this approach have found a presumption of bias without requiring the student to show actual bias
on the part of a decision-maker, leading to the conclusion that the procedural due process required
was not afforded. 181 This cautious approach taken by these courts contrasts directly with the
majority Fifth Circuit approach that requires a showing of actual bias in order to disqualify an
individual from serving as a hearing officer or from serving multiple roles in the proceedings. 182
In Gonzales v. McEuen, a federal district court in California presumed bias from the nature
of individuals' roles in the disciplinary process and their presence at a deliberation session of the
local school board. 183 The court in Gonzales found that the involvement of both the district's
attorney and its superintendent in a student's initial disciplinary proceedings rose to the level that
bias could be presumed, regardless of whether actual bias existed. 184 There, the district's attorney
had both prosecuted the student's expulsion and advised the school board of its legal obligations
during the hearing. 185 The court presumed bias on the part of the attorney without any actual
evidence, finding that the attorney's multiple roles violated the student's right to an impartial
tribunal. 186
The court also presumed bias from the role the superintendent played, where he served as
both chief of the prosecution team for the expulsion and was present during the school board's
closed deliberations after the hearing. 1 8 7 Significantly, the court rejected the district's contention
that the superintendent was not actually biased because he did not participate at all in the
deliberations but was merely present to serve refreshments to the board, reasoning that "[w]hether
he did or did not participate, his presence to some extent might operate as an inhibiting restraint
179 Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 464-65 ("It is undisputed that attorneys for the District who prosecuted the charges
against the plaintiffs in the expulsion proceedings, also represent the Board members in this action. . . . Counsel for
defendants admit that they advised the Board prior to the hearings with respect to its obligations regarding these
expulsions[.] . . . A reading of the transcript reveals how difficult it was to separate the two roles. Special mention
should be made of the fact that the Board enjoys no legal expertise and must rely heavily upon its counsel. This places

defendants' attorneys in a position of intolerable prominence and influence.").
s See, e.g., id.; Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529; Bd. of Educ. of Arapahoe Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. Lockhart, 687 P.2d 1306,
1308 (Colo. 1984) (holding that it was impermissible for the board of education to permit its district attorney to be
present during closed deliberations after teacher termination hearing); English v. North East Bd. of Educ., 348 A.2d
494, 494-95 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (articulating per se rule in termination hearings against school attorneys acting
as both adversarial counsel and advising the school board of its obligations); Nemi v. Bd. of Educ. of Kearsley Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 303 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
' Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 465.
182 Brewer, 779 F.2d at 264; See also Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529 (holding that no violation existed where school board
attorney prosecuted the student's charges and advised the board during closed-session deliberations, and where
principal and superintendent, who testified against the student, were also present during deliberations because student
presented no evidence of actual bias).
183 See Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 464-66.
184 Id. at 464-65.
185 Id. By way of illustration, the trial court cited the transcript of the disciplinary tribunal, at which the school board
attorney served as prosecutor while also alerting the board how to rule on evidentiary questions. Id. at 464 ("[c]ounsel
for defendants admit that they advised the Board prior to the hearings with respect to its obligations regarding these
expulsions, but they deny that they advised the Board during the proceedings themselves. A reading of the transcripts

reveals how difficult it was to separate these roles").
18 6

Id. at 464 (calling the dual roles difficult to separate and citing to a dialogue in the hearing transcript in which
counsel for the district objected to a request by counsel for the student and made legal recommendations that the
school board uphold its objection).
187 Id. at 464-65.
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upon the freedom of action and expression of the Board." 18 8 The court's rejection of the district's
argument here represents the court's sensitivity to facts showing an appearanceof bias even in the
absence of actual bias, forming the basis for an entirely different impartiality standard than courts
following the Fifth Circuit approach. 189
Other courts have adopted a similar standard. 190 In Butler v. Franklin Oak Creek School
District, a student was charged with misconduct for violating a provision of the district's athletic
code. 191 He faced the possibility of a twelve-month suspension from participation in student
athletics. Consistent with the district's procedures, the student was afforded a hearing before the
Coaches' Council, a decision-making body comprised of various school administrators including
the athletic director who had recommended the student's removal. 192 After the hearing, the
Coaches' Council voted to suspend the student. 193 As a threshold matter, the court determined that
the removal from participation in school athletics constituted a deprivation of a property interest
guaranteed by state law and district regulations. 194 The court found the athletic director's role as
both initiator of discipline and decision-maker unconstitutional, reasoning that the athletic
director's role was not merely investigatory, but required him to make an initial recommendation
of discipline. 1 9 5 According to the court, a tribunal reviewing the athletic director's discipline
recommendation could not be impartial where the director cast a vote in the adjudication of his
own decision. 196 Thus, in absence of actual evidence of bias, the court found the dual roles of
initiator of discipline and member of decision-making tribunal to be constitutionally
impermissible. 197

The concern for impartiality emphasized by the Gonzales court and those following its
approach represent a distinct departure from the thin interpretation used by courts taking the Fifth
Circuit's approach. Cases like Gonzales and Butler acknowledge a constitutionally intolerable risk
of bias when an individual serving as a hearing officer or on a disciplinary hearing panel has been
involved in initiating or prosecuting a student's case. 198 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit approach
recognizes no presumption of bias and grants express approval of the use of hearing officers who
435 F. Supp. at 465.
In doing so, the court employed the Ninth Circuit's standard for impartiality used in administrative tribunals, a
standard rejected in the school context by courts taking the majority Fifth Circuit approach. See Stivers v. Pierce, 71
F.3d 732, 748 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[w]e therefore hold that where one member of a tribunal is actually biased, or where
the circumstances create the appearancethat one member is biased, the proceedings violate due process") (emphasis
added).
1 90
See, e.g., Everett, 426 F. Supp. at 402 (precluding the "principal of the school who holds the first informal hearing
and recommends" the discipline from operating as an impartial hearing officer because such an individual would not
be "fair and impartial").
191 Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin Sch. Dist., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107-08 (E.D. Wisc. 2001).
192 Id. at 1107.
193 Id. at 1108.
1 94
Id. at 1110 (as a matter of state law and the school district's own student handbook, student-athletes have right to
continued participation in school athletics and may not be suspended from such without good cause).
195 Id. at 1116 ("[t]hese adjudicative and decision-making functions far exceed mere investigation").
18 Gonzales,
189

196 Id.
197 Butler,

172 F. Supp. at 1116.
198 See Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 465 (finding that students' due process was violated where the superintendent, as
"chief of the 'prosecution' team," was present in the school board's closed deliberation session "whether he did or did
not participate [because] his presence to some extent might operate as an inhibiting restraint upon the freedom of
action and expression of the board"); Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1115-16 (finding that the initiator of the student's
discipline could not constitutionally serve on the adjudicatory council because of the inherent risk of bias).
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have also investigated, prosecuted, or handed down charges at earlier stages in the proceeding
absent actual evidence of bias. 199 The judicial disparity in what constitutes an impartial tribunal
muddies the waters of a major constitutional doctrine and leads to potential litigants presenting
arguments within that doctrine supported by unreliable federal court precedent and that results in
unpredictable results.
The majority of federal courts' approach as detailed above, inadequately safeguards
students' due process right to an impartial tribunal by rejecting a strict construal of "impartial" in
the school discipline context. The courts have unfairly separated school exclusion from other
deprivations requiring due process because of the increasingly adversarial nature of the school
discipline landscape and the scale of the deprivations students face in being excluded from
mainstream public education. This reality is most popularly conceived in the recent and prolific
school-to-prison pipeline scholarship. Because courts have failed to adequately take into account
the elements at stake for students facing long-term discipline, their due process balancing
calculation, as imposed by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, is discretely unbalanced,
with procedures convenient to the public schools outweighing potential student hardships. 200 A
constitutional jurisprudence of due process requires a new calculation that would account for the
modern school discipline landscape and contemporary school exclusion research that shows the
severe consequences of students excluded from school. Constitutional due process requires more
of the federal courts than what protections they have provided, and a Supreme Court challenge to
the majority approach would have strong arguments in its favor.
Courts holding to the Fifth Circuit approach generally reject the importation of judicial
norms into the school discipline context. 20 1 The most common rationale for this approach is that
the school discipline context is far-removed from the consequences and deprivations of civil or
criminal proceedings that justify cautious approaches to biased adjudicators under the Matthews
test. 202 However, there is reason to compare the criminal judicial context and the school discipline
context favorably, especially in light of what is at stake for students facing severe disciplinary
charges. 203 The extensive research since Goss shows that the deprivations that decision
contemplated-namely, reputational harm and property interest in education itself-fall short of
what students who receive long-term discipline consequences actually suffer.204

199 Brewer, 779 F.2d at
200 Matthews, 424 U.S.

264; Sullivan, 475 F.2d at 1077.
at 335.
201 See supra note 198 (collecting cases).
202 See supra note 198 (collecting cases). See also Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14 (holding that a fair hearing
in the student
disciplinary context need not mirror the common law adversarial method nor criminal trial procedures); Jennings, 397
F.3d at 1124 (affording full due process protections beyond "trial-type procedures" for students facing long-term
suspensions would be cost-prohibitive and inefficient for school districts) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 565). See also id.
at 585 (J. Powell, dissenting); Black, supra note 17, at 845 (positing that one of Goss'central flaws was its expectations
that "the non-adversarial theory of education would persist naturally, notwithstanding the Court's intervention," and
that "administrators would implement and apply due process with good faith and benevolence"). One of Justice
Powell's law clerks who served a few years before Goss was decidedly against Goss' holding, objecting to what he
termed the constitutionalizing of the disciplinary process "at a time ... when the maximum flexibility may be required
by school officials in different parts of the country to reduce the level of violence in secondary education." J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 66 (1975).
203

See supra Part II.B.

204

id.
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Further, the modem adversarial landscape of school discipline cases presents reasons to
insist that due process requires thicker impartiality protections. 205 According to the flexible
principles of due process, 2 0 6 where the school discipline tribunal operates less like the "informal
give-and-take" envisioned by Goss 20 7 and more like an adversarial, administrative hearing, as the
research suggests, courts should adapt by applying thicker impartiality protections. The benign
administration relationship is no longer present. Rather than urging its continued presence2 0 8 , or
mourning its loss, courts should recognize the necessity of providing the same impartiality
protections in school discipline cases that are applied in other administrative contexts. 209
B. The Best PracticesApproach and its Inadequacy
Many commentators have adeptly examined student due process questions left open by
Goss, and there are simply too many cogent challenges of ineffectual due process protections
afforded students to name here. However, this Section will mention a few notable resources that
may be used for further insight. In an early, pre-Goss outline of student discipline due process,
Professor Buss provides a comprehensive approach to the open due process issues, many of which
remained open after Goss was decided. 2 10 His article, titled ProceduralDue Processfor School
Discipline: Probing the ConstitutionalOutline, begins with a lucid and foretelling description of
the "mystique" surrounding school issues that is the foundation of judicial reluctance to import
due process principles into the school discipline context. 2 11 Professor Black, in his excellent article
discussing the ambitions and failures of Goss, points out the need for a more robust substantive
due process regime for students facing long-term discipline, especially in light of the rise of zerotolerance discipline policies and the trend of disciplinary matters being handled in the courtroom
instead of the principal's office. 2 12 Commentators have confronted procedural due process defects
with persistence, with voices emerging from the fields of legal and education scholarship, as well
as from the emerging field of education law advocacy. 2 13 As an attorney representing families in
student discipline cases, Brent M. Pattison, argues convincingly for students' right to confront and

205 See supra Part II.A.

Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
208 See, e.g., C.B. by & Through Breeding, 82 F.3d at 388 (opportunities for student to "discuss" her
concerns with the
imposition of a nine-day suspension adequate procedural due process) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 584).
209 See infra Part IV for examples of non-judicial administrative hearing contexts where courts provide adequate
impartiality consistent with due process.
210 See Buss, supra note
148.
211 Buss, supra note 148, at 570 ("Transcending all of the particular reasons.. .to explain the refusal
to hear student
due process claims is a... reluctance by the courts to intrude into educational matters. Educational institutions seem to
be enshrouded with a mystical immunity from judicial interference").
212 See generally Black, supra note
17.
213 The emergence of a niche practice area filling a demand in the legal market for attorneys representing
students in
discipline and special education hearings and attorneys representing districts themselves-a practice area not widely
in existence until recent years-is itself further evidence for the increasingly adversarial nature of school discipline
issues. See, e.g., Diane E. Millet, Back to School EducationLaw, 23 G.P. SOLO 24 (2006); Lori Tripoli, A Marketing
Ploy That's Worked... Law Firm Commitments to IndustryNiche PracticesReapBenefits, 18 OF COUNSEL 1, 13 (1999)
(noting defensive education law as a profitable emerging niche practice alongside nuclear power, airport law, mining,
and insurance tax law).
206
207
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cross-examine witnesses at discipline tribunals. 2 14 Meanwhile, Alicia Insley's note, authored as a
law student at Washington College of Law, criticizes zero-tolerance discipline policies because
they apply harsh punishments that can only be reviewed by courts applying highly deferential
standards. 2 15 Professor Perry A. Zirkel, an education and law professor, and Youssef Chouhoud, a
graduate student, examine post-Goss due process empirically, comparing procedural due process
outcomes in state and federal courts finding in favor of students to those finding in favor of
districts. 2 16 The student discipline procedural due process commentary is thus rife with wellresearched and persuasive scholarship.
Commentators have focused to a much lesser extent on the open question of what
constitutes impartiality for students facing long-term discipline. Though much commentary has
identified the question, such as Professor Kern Alexander's preeminent volume on school law, 2 17
and Professor Kirp's cogent and predictive analysis of due process in the school discipline context
immediately following Goss,2 18 few commentators have addressed the question normatively. 2 19
Some earlier commentary that has done so distinguished the school discipline setting from other
administrative contexts. 220
For instance, in early, pre-Goss commentary encouraging fuller impartiality protections
against institutional bias in administrative law settings, Professor McCormack rejects the need for
per se bias in the school exclusion setting, holding ranks with what has become the majority
approach as outlined above. 22 1 Pre-Goss commentary was not all in favor of limited impartiality
protections; Professor Buss includes a persuasive section in his outline of constitutional processes
on the need for a different approach to the right of an impartial tribunal more akin to protections
provided in comparable administrative law settings. 222 Buss' insistence that institutional biases
See generally Pattison, supra note 17; see also Brent M. Pattison, Can What You Don't Know Hurt You?:
Substantive Due Process, Weapon Possession, and Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039 (2001).
215 See generally Insley, supra note
81.
216 Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, The Goss Progeny: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 45 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 353, 370
214

74% of cases studied).
See KERN ALEXANDER, ET AL., AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 459 (6th ed. 2005) (lower courts including the

(2008) (local districts won "conclusive victories" in
2 17

fifth and sixth circuits will not disqualify an administrator from serving as a decision-maker at the student's
disciplinary tribunal without a showing of pre-existing animus or actual bias); Pattison, supra note 17, at 52, n. 26
(lower court decisions have required an impartial hearing officer and have at times questioned the impartiality of a

tribunal that has relied on district counsel as advisor of procedures and prosecutor of the student's disciplinary charges)
(citing Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 460-65).
218 David L. Kirp, Proceduralismand Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 862

(1976) (recognizing likelihood that due process requirements in the public schools could transform into perfunctory
affairs, which could lead to the importation of biased decision-making).
219 See Cooper, supra note 138, at 40 (surveying student discipline due process decisions involving, among other
issues, claims of partiality); Frances P. Solari & Julienne E.M. Balshaw, Outlawed and Flawed: Zero Tolerance and
Second GenerationRace Discriminationin Public Schools, 29 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 147, 167 (2007); Sam A. Mackie,
Proof That School Board Improperly Expelled Student From School, 55 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 313 (2000)

(pointing out the many unsuccessful partiality and bias claims of suspended and expelled students); David
Rosborough, Left Behind, and Then Pushed Out: Charting a JurisprudentialFramework to Remedy Illegal Student
Exclusions, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 663, 689 n. 166 (2010) (identifying varying degrees of impartiality protections in
lower court decisions).
220 See, e.g., Wayne McCormack, The Purpose of Due Process:FairHearingor Vehicle for JudicialReview, 52 TEX.
L. R. 1257 (1974).
221 Id. at 1287-89 (bias at in school discipline cases "should disqualify only if it is so strong that it prevents the
compilation of an adequate record for review").
222 See Buss, supra note 148, at 618-30.
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threatened the fairness of students' due process hearings while powerful, was not accompanied by
the empirical data for consequences to school exclusion that is now widely known and available.
However, scarce commentary can be found since Goss that has picked up on Buss' constitutional
fairness arguments with the same force.
In the recent era, those commentators who have argued normatively for thicker impartiality
protections have recommended more robust safeguards without confronting the issue head-on
through the lens of legal mandate from constitutional due process. 223 Educational practitioner
David Doty, for example, emphasizes the importance of districts providing thick impartiality
protections by using independent decision-makers not involved in prosecuting roles without
recognizing a constitutional mandate to do so. 2 2 4 Likewise, in their wide-ranging survey on postGoss due process requirements for short and long-term school discipline cases, Larry Bartlett and
James McCullagh argue against allowing prosecution team members into post-hearing
deliberations if the student and his attorney are excluded, while also stressing that "not all of the
foregoing elements of due process are required."2 2 5 Rather than arguing from a constitutional due
process requirement lens, commentators like Bartlett, McCullagh, and Doty encourage efforts at
providing neutral decision-makers neutrality through a best practices approach.2 26 This approach
offers suggestions for more benevolent procedures to avoid "legal challenge," to increase the
chances of school district success in ensuing due process claims, 227 and to call educators to act
ethically in order to "model[] valuable lessons to students that will have a positive impact on the
future of the country."228
While the best practices approach typified by the scholarship above presents school
districts with incentives to provide heightened due process protections, the approach falls short of
advocating for the type of thick safeguards against the appearance of bias that have long been
afforded individuals in other comparable administrative settings. 229 In doing so, the approach
stops short of arguing that constitutional protections requirethick impartiality protections, such as
a decision-maker free from the appearance of bias or the existence of unduly influential ex parte
communications with administrators playing multiple roles in disciplinary functions.
This best practices approach-aimed at local school officials rather than state
legislatures-has at its foundation, litigation prevention strategies and moral reasoning that
suggests administrators should police their own behavior out of a sense of educational duty, rather
than by constitutional mandate. 230 In this way, the approach proceeds where Goss left off, using
See Bartlett & McCullagh, supra note 35, at 57; Doty, supra note 34, at 358.
See Doty, supra note 34, at 358 (pointing out potential impartiality issues where a hearing officer's neutrality may
be undermined by her involvement in the investigation and prosecution of the student's disciplinary charges) ("[t]he
importance of avoiding even the appearance of impropriety during expulsion proceedings cannot be overstated").
225 Bartlett & McCullagh, supra note 35,
at 57.
226 Id.; Doty, supra note 34, at
358.
227 Bartlett & McCullagh, supra note 35, at
55.
228 Id. at 57.
229 See generally Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
491.
230
Doty, supra note 34, at 359 (while the normative methods encouraged are not all required by legal mandate, "[t]hey
merely represent the items of due process that public school officials should observe for better decision making, being
a role model, fairness, exhibiting good educational principles, and lessening the likelihood of being in or losing a
lawsuit"). Some lower courts strike a similar tone, emphasizing reliance on the "honor and good judgment" of
administrators to police themselves for bias. See, e.g., Alex v. Allen, 409 F. Supp. 379, 388 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (allowing
school board attorneys and school administrators to serve multiple roles while also serving as tribunal decision-makers
even though such practices present possibilities "for abuse and prejudice").
223

224
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as its starting point a school discipline landscape occupied by benign administrators rather than
the adversarial landscape research shows it has become. 23 1 Other recent commentators seem to go
further toward recognizing the constitutional necessity of thicker protections, but still stop short of
asserting that their recommended procedures are required by due process. 232 To be fair, the
commentary normatively prescribing solutions to the question of what constitutes an impartial
tribunal cited above is often a component part of larger scholarly works addressing procedural
questions and defects presented by Goss' progeny, and the purpose of their discussions generally
lay outside the purview of the constitutionality of the current impartiality standard.2 33
Further, the best practices approach lacks a realistic vision for thicker impartiality
protections. By limiting the source of its normative impartiality recommendations to educational
best practices and litigation prevention, it does not generally envisage an in-depth, realistic
approach of how the goal of providing independent, uninvolved decision-makers above the
appearance of bias and beyond undue influence might be conceivably achieved. It thus fails to
address one of the main arguments in favor of construing impartiality thinly-namely, the
argument that thick impartiality protections require unreasonable expenditures of public
resources. 234
While appreciating that others have identified issues and offered up potential normative
solutions, this Note goes further by arguing that the impartial tribunal guaranteed to students
through due process requires independent and uninvolved decision-makers who are free from the
appearance or influence of bias. In this way, this Note seeks to revive the more cautious, thicker
approach to impartiality on which Professor Buss struck ground in his pre-Goss scholarship,
drawing parallels to other administrative hearing contexts and appropriately adjusting the due
process balancing scheme using evidence from the school-to-prison pipeline research.2 35 Further,
this Note offers on-the-ground illustrations of (1) the appropriate standard for impartiality as seen
in some lower court decisions presented above, (2) some ways state legislatures have complied
with the standard through effective school discipline procedures, and (3) some provisions for use
in model legislation to afford thicker impartiality protections.
IV.

A THICKER APPROACH FROM CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PRINCIPLES

A fuller approach to impartiality would go beyond the Fifth Circuit's "actual bias" test, instead
opting for the nature of a standard chosen by the Gonzales decision, which recognizes the ability
of bias to slip in unnoticed or unproven by discoverable evidence. 236 In that approach, the provision
of a decision-maker free from the appearance of bias is not simply a best practice for school
231

See supra Part II.A.

See Doty, supra note 34, at 358-59 ("it behooves districts to employ a truly independent individual as the hearing
officer, particularly where school administrators and attorneys are integrally involved in the investigation, and
232

prosecution, of serious misconduct").

See, e.g., Doty, supra note 34.
See C.B. by & Through Breeding, 82 F.3d at 388 ("always requiring an impartial decisionmaker to be educated on
the facts would render the process too complex"); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14-15 (providing heightened impartiality
safeguards would represent an "undue judicialization" that would require "unjustifiable" expenditures and "improper
allocation of resources").
235 See Buss, supra note 148.
2 36
See Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 465.
233

234
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districts as commentators have suggested.23 7 Rather, constitutional principles require this practice
under the Supreme Court's traditional balancing test for the implementation of additional
procedural safeguards to prevent an erroneous deprivation of a property or liberty interest. 238
Further, the practice of providing a decision-maker free from the appearance of bias is not limited
to the judicial setting, and has been implemented in certain administrative settings that compare
favorably to school discipline hearings. 23 9
A. Balancing Interests: Providing a Decision-Maker Free from the Appearance of Bias
As Goss instructed, when a public school district excludes a student from school, it
deprives a student of a property right guaranteed by the state's constitutional provision of public
education and delegated to the local district for administration. 240 Such a deprivation triggers the
state's burden to proceed under procedural due process consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment. 24 1 A deprivation that involves a suspension of more than ten days or expulsion from
the school will require greater due process, including a formal hearing presided over by hearing
officers who are free from bias or its appearance. 242 This approach might allow a school
disciplinary hearing to reflect the same due process in administrative contexts afforded individuals
facing severe consequences from deprivation. Such a standard would demand that an "uninvolved
person" hear the case, requiring that person to be uninfluenced and independent from the inner
workings of the student's discipline case, so that "complete objectivity" may be afforded.243 A
challenge to the Fifth Circuit's approach, which presumes an absence of bias and allows
administrators and school board attorneys to perform multiple roles in the "prosecution" and
hearing process, would argue that providing such an impartiality standard is more than "best
practice" for a school district, but instead is constitutionally required.
The on-the-ground realities of the public school setting suggest that caution and a
willingness to presume bias from prior involvement in a student's case is not over-reaching
because an administrator who investigates a student's disciplinary matters possesses at least a
modicum of interest in the outcome of the case. 244 Indeed, if the administrator did not, that
individual would be hard-pressed to explain to her supervisors, conscious of the time scarcity of
public resources, why she so intently prosecuted or investigated the charges in the first place. In
the criminal law setting, a detective or prosecutor would never be permitted to serve as an
adjudicator of the defendant's charges, though they be free from any form of actual bias toward
the subject of their investigations. This is because we assume that the role they play is dissonant
with making an adjudication on the evidence, and because we are interested in a certain standard
See supra Part IIIB.
See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 323 (in order to determine whether additional safeguards are necessary to prevent an
erroneous deprivation of a constitutionally-recognized property or liberty interest, a court must weigh the private
interest that will be affected by the official action, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the probable value of any
additional safeguards).
239 See, e.g., Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486 (applying the presumption of impartiality to administrative parole hearings).
240
See Goss, 419 U.S. at 573.
241 Black Coal. v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 10, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th
Cir. 1973).
242 See id. at 1044 (" [t]he requirement of a prior hearing will depend primarily on the nature of the penalty
imposed").
24 3
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486.
2
1Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334 ("[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands") (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.). See also Pattison, supra note 17, at 51.
237
238
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of propriety at the hearing that is discordant with the possibility of bias. Likewise, in the school
discipline context, a prosecutor or investigator, no matter how well intentioned, should be excluded
from the adjudication process because of her role in earlier stages of the proceeding.
Advocates of the Fifth Circuit's more lenient approach toward impartiality would counter
by asserting that providing adjudicators who are absolutely uninvolved in the proceeding in any
other way unduly "judicializes" the proceeding and is not required to ensure an impartial
hearing. 24 5 They would argue that the educational process is harmed through such judicialization.
However, the proper test of whether a safeguard is constitutionally required is whether the private
interest outweighs the burden to the government. 246 Here, because of the nature of the publicschool context, the student's interest in having an uninvolved adjudicator overseeing his or her
hearing outweighs the district's burden of providing one. Regarding the student's interest, where
an adjudicator has been involved in the charges in an investigatory or prosecutorial role, the threat
of bias, and in turn, an erroneous exclusion of the student from school, is substantial. This is
because school discipline becomes an adversarial process immediately once an allegation is
entered.2 47 An administrator who initiates discipline against a student is in a position of authority
and has often already been involved in instituting prior discipline against the student (especially
in serious suspension or expulsion cases). The disciplinary history alone indicates the appearance
of bias.
To satisfy the due process requirement of providing an impartial tribunal without the
existence of bias, a proper resolution would align with Gonzales' approach presented above. 248
Specifically, it would guarantee that an administrator or counsel who has initiated charges,
prosecuted the case, advised the school board, or recommended the disciplinary consequence at
issue would not serve as an adjudicator over the student's disciplinary due process hearing. 2 4 9 Such
a safeguard would ensure that the student's constitutional rights are afforded and would limit the
attention federal courts are required to give to claims of impartiality.
B. Lessons from Administrative Law: Impartiality in Parole Revocation Hearings and the
APA's Separation of Functions Doctrine
Both the Administrative Procedure Act 250 and federal court common law doctrines have
recognized the need for the provision of impartial decision-makers to claimants facing
administrative hearings where a deprivation is at stake. 25 1 Within the jurisprudential realm of the
APA, the separation of functions doctrine is the best example of thick impartiality protections in

245
246

See, e.g., C.B. by & Through Breeding, 82 F.3d at 388, n. 3.
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.

247 See supra Part II.A.

See supra Part III.A.
See Gonzales, supra note 47, at 464-66.
250 The Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA] is the federal statute that governs rulemaking
and adjudicative
functions of federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59.
251 See, e.g., Finer Foods, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 274 F.3d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 2001); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
471.
248

249
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the administrative law context, 25225though the doctrine is not applied in all circumstances.25 3
A pre-APA administrative law case, Morrissey v. Brewer, shows that raising the standard
of decision-maker impartiality in state-level administrative proceedings is not a novel concept.254
The holding in Morrissey echoes the general preference for decision-makers free from the
appearance of bias through the separation of investigative and adjudicative functions in certain
types of adjudications. 255 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court identified a deficit in the state's
procedures for parolees facing revocation, which was to permit the parolee's law enforcement
officer to adjudicate the case. 256 In doing so, the Court went beyond the definition of impartiality
state penal systems were employing by requiring that parole revocation be administratively
adjudicated by an "uninvolved person." 25 7 The Court's reasoning relied on a balancing of interests
of the parolee against those of the State, recognizing the primary interest of the parolee in retaining
his liberty and the primary interests of the State in preventing once-convicted individuals from
again committing antisocial behaviors. 2 58 The Court further noted the State's interests associated
with saving time and resources by returning the parolee to prison rather than re-trying him or her
for the violations of parole conditions. 259 The Court also noted society's interest in the parolee's
continued freedom from the utility the parolee would provide to society outside of prison, as well
as the alleviation to taxpayers of the burden of the parolee's prison costs. 2 6 0 While acknowledging
that it would be unfair to assume all parole officers were biased or partial in their adjudication of
revocation hearings, the Court found that on balance, parole revocation hearings require that a
hearing for the parolee be conducted by a person uninvolved with the parolee's case. 2 6 1 I so
See 5 U.S.C.

252

§ 554(d); Groiler v. F.T.C., 615 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980) ("by forbidding adjudication by

persons engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions, Congress intended to preclude from

decision-making in a particular case not only individuals with the title of "investigator" or "prosecutor," but all persons
who had, in that or a factually related case, been involved with ex parte communication, or who had developed, by
prior involvement with the case, a will to win"); Elliott v. S.E.C., 36 F.3d 86, 87 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[a]n agency may
combine investigative, adversarial, and adjudicative functions, as long as no employees serve in dual roles") (emphasis
added); Girard v. Klopfenstein, 930 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1991) (validating a procedural hearing where investigative
and adjudicative functions were not merged); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45-46 (1950) (finding a
due process violation where a hearing was conducted by members of an administrative agency's investigative branch).
253 See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58 ("the combination of investigative adjudicative functions does not, without more,
constitute a due process violation"). See also, e.g., In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 925 (3d Cir. 1994) (using an actual
bias test for adjudicators who have served investigative functions in financial oversight body hearings); Simpson v.
Office of Thrift Supervision, 29 F.3d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 1994) (initiation of charges against claimant by director of
financial oversight body did not render director unable to act as impartial decision-maker at claimant's hearing); Hirrill
v. Merriweather, 629 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[w]ithin the context of public administrative law and procedure,
a claimant or litigant is not denied a constitutionally guaranteed fair hearing before an impartial tribunal simply
because the agency factfinders or decision-makers may have had some prior knowledge or even preliminary
participation in the case"). See generally Roland M. Frye, Jr., Restricted Communications at the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 315 (2007); but see Finer Foods, 274 F.3d at 1140 (finding that even
informal adjudications under the APA require impartial decision-makers "without a stake in the outcome").
254
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 471.
255 See supra note 253.
256ITd.
257
2 58

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486.

1Id. at 483.

259 Id.
260 Id. at 484.
261

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485 ("[i]t would be unfair to assume that the parole officer bears hostility against the parolee
that destroys his neutrality.... However, we need not make any assumptions... to conclude that there should be an
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holding, the Court reasoned that this procedure was necessary in light of the interests of the parolee
and to ensure the parolee received an adjudicator with "complete objectivity," which a parolee's
officer who recommended the revocation could not be expected to possess. 2 62

V.

THICKER IMPARTIALITY FOR STUDENTS FACING SCHOOL EXCLUSION

In light of the similarity of school discipline due process hearings to parole revocation
hearings in Morrissey, the standard of impartiality extended in that case should likewise be
extended to students facing long-term discipline by local school boards, consistent with principles
of constitutional procedural due process and long-held administrative law doctrines. Rather than
creating an "undue judicialization" 263 of the school discipline process, the implementation of a
Morrissey-likeimpartiality standard in school discipline hearings would not be overly burdensome
to school districts. The acceptance of the standard by some forward-thinking state legislation
supports this notion and provides a starting point for provisions that would comport more fully
with due process. 264

A. Extending Morrissey Protections to School Discipline Hearings
The parole board hearing and the student discipline contexts are similar; the articulated
function of parole that the Morrissey Court outlined as launching "the parolee into constructive
development," 265 parallels the hoped-for functions of school discipline, where the goal is not
simply to punish a student, but to restore the student to a readiness for education. 266 The liberty
interests of parolees in Morrissey are also similar to the interests of students facing long-term
discipline in not being excluded from school erroneously. Like a parolee who is kept from
obtaining gainful employment, the freedom to be with family and friends, and the ability to enjoy
"the attachments of normal life," students who face exclusion from school could reasonably suffer
future employment consequences. 267 Students likewise face the loss of enjoyment of a "normal
life" for a person of their age, which includes both academic and social opportunities stemming
from attending mainstream public school, as well as the liberty interests associated with pursuing
opportunities limited by the stain of a disciplinary charge on the student's record.2 6 8 Additionally,
just as society shares an interest in a parolee's continued liberty, society shares an interest in a
student's ability to remain in mainstream public education. Research strongly supports the
contention that society is benefited by an educated population, 269 and this notion is maximized by
uninvolved person to make this preliminary evaluation for the basis for believing the conditions of parole have been

violated").
262
263

Id. at 486.
Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15.

264 See, e.g. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-B

§

2506.

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478.
266 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583 (discipline must remain "part of the teaching process").
267 Goss explicitly recognized the deprivation of liberty interest stemming from educational and occupational
consequences of a student's discipline record long before school-to-prison pipeline research began to take shape. Id.
265

at 575 (charges of misconduct, "if sustained and recorded... could seriously damage those students' standing with their
fellow pupils and their teacher as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment").
2 68 id.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). See also Hillel Y.
Levin, Tax Credit Scholarship Programs and the Changing Ecology of Public Education, 45 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1033,
269
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the prison-pipeline research tying first-time school exclusion to dropout rates and criminal
activity. 270 Thus, similar to the termination of interests of a parolee facing revocation, the
termination of a student's ability to participate in public education would be tantamount to a
"grievous loss" for the student 2 7 1 and likely for society as well.
The state's interests in having a lower standard of impartiality in Morrissey and in the
school discipline context similarly correspond with the state's interest in the school discipline
context being arguably lower than those involved in parole revocation hearings. School districts
and college governing bodies have echoed the state's argument in Morrissey that maintaining a
lower standard of impartiality retains non-adversarial procedures essential to the efficient process
of adjudication already in place. 272 The Court rejected this argument, declaring that a state's
interest in its own discretion over parole procedures would not be interfered with by the
requirement of a hearing before an uninvolved adjudicator. 273 Similarly, a school district's
argument that a requirement of higher standards for impartiality is an unnecessary judicial
interference with uniquely local functions must fail because the interference is minimal.27 4 Thus,
the corresponding interests and deprivations at stake show Morrissey to be a strong case for the
requirement of a higher standard of impartiality in the school discipline setting that would
guarantee the provision of an independent, "wholly disinterested" decision-maker, free from the
influence or appearance of bias, for a student's long-term discipline adjudication. 275
B. Ways Forward: Laudable State Legislation and Proposed Model Educational Code
Provisions
As noted above, the asserted burden on a school district of providing an impartial
adjudicator of a student's disciplinary charges is much slighter than the case law suggests. 27 6 State
legislation and practices that routinely employ the use of independent decision-makers in school
discipline cases provide evidence that the practice is not unfeasible or unreasonably
burdensome. 2 7 7 At a minimum, a district's provision of school board members who do not know
the student or have not seen any of the facts of the charges prior to the hearing would not
1073 (2013) ("society as a whole enjoys the benefits of a well-educated
educational system fails"); Derek W. Black, CharterSchools, Vouchers,

population, and it pays the price when the
and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L.

REV. 445, 451-52 (2013). See generally Henry M. Levin, 4 ALB. GOv'T L. REV. 394 (2011).
2 70

See supra Part II.B.
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Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
272 C.B. by & Through Breeding, 82 F.3d at 388 n. 3 (calling the disqualification of prosecuting administrators as
decision-makers "impossible," "undesirable," and "too complex"); Newsome, 842 F.2d at 926 ("We decline to place
upon a board of laymen the duty of observing and applying common-law rules of evidence"); Wasson v. Trowbridge,
382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967) (Strictly providing for a separation of investigative and adjudicative functions at all

times is "unduly burdensome").
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Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483.
As discussed above, states like Georgia use independent and uninvolved hearing officers routinely as required by
statute. See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-753 (2004). Other states, like Illinois, employ the practice routinely even
in the absence of statutory requirements to do so. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-105(2)(c) (2013); 105 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/10-22.6(b) (1988).
275 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at
137.
276 See, e.g., C.B. by & Through Breeding, 82 F.3d at
388, n. 3.
277 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(F) (2010); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48918(d) (Deering
2016); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 22-33-105 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-753 (2004); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6(a) (1988); OR. ADMIN.
R. 581-021-0070(2) (2016).
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overburden the district. However, in order to be effective, such a practice would have to grant the
board the ability to develop the factual record rather than deferring to an administrator's factual
record developed below. Simply giving the board a deferential view of the facts developed below
by an involved, and potentially biased, administrator would defeat the purpose of the separation of
hearings.
To ensure freedom from bias, a better practice by far is illustrated by districts that employ
independent hearing officers who are neither district employees nor board members. The District
of Columbia stands out as a strong example of this practice by affirmatively relocating long-term
suspension or expulsion cases to the Chancellor of Education's hearing office for adjudication
requiring the use of an independent hearing officer in long-term exclusion cases. 27 8 Such a practice
prevents the appearance of bias, but does so without administratively overburdening the district,
since the hearing method is essentially "outsourced" to other individuals or entities, thereby
decreasing the district's burden in providing better safeguards against bias. 279
A myriad of other examples is found in states that do not require the use of an independent
hearing officer as advocated by this Note but permit their use by local district delegation. 280 Even
in absence of the requirement, districts in those states routinely employ the use of hearing
officers. 28 1 In states requiring or permitting the use of independent hearing officers, those officers
may be selected from a wide range of individuals. Some states, such as Arizona, allow districts to
select officers from lists of individuals approved by the school board who serve as administrative
hearing officers. 282 Other states require the selection of specifically sanctioned school discipline
hearing officers, 283 and some states with well-developed administrative adjudication regimes
permit the use of state administrative law judges to serve as discipline hearing officers, 284 a
practice which lends efficiency and experience to the process to the benefit of both students and
districts. Though the "how" is less important than the "why," the above models serve as examples
to show that providing an impartial, uninvolved hearing officer can be achieved with a low burden
on school districts, especially when compared to the high burden of consequences with which
students at disciplinary hearings are faced.
Finally, this Note presents a sampling of model provisions representing strong impartiality
protections that would go beyond the current thin impartiality safeguards and fall along the
protections afforded by the education code of Washington D.C. and the federal court decisions of
Gonzales and Butler. Section 1 of the model legislation should read:
Section 1: Requirement of Hearing: (A) Local boards of education shall hold a Due
Process Hearing for any student facing charges of suspension of more than ten days
or expulsion, to occur within seven calendar days of the principal's initiation of
disciplinary charges. (B) The hearing required by this Section may be in addition

2 78

See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-B § 2507.1.
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REV. STAT.
33-105
(2013);
105
ILL.
COMP.
STAT.
5/10-22.6(a)
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to, and shall not be replaced by, any preliminary hearing before an administrator
employed by the District. 2 85
Section 2 of the model legislation should read:
Section 2: Adjudication of the Hearing by Impartial Decision-Maker: (A) Local
boards of education shall appoint a Hearing Officer or Hearing Panel to serve as
impartial decision-makers presiding over the Hearing required by Section 1. (B)
The following functions shall disqualify an individual from serving as a Hearing
Officer or member of a Hearing Panel: (1) Initiation of disciplinary charges against
the student including recommendation of charges to the local board of education;
(2) Investigation of the student's misconduct related to the charges; (3) Prosecution
of the charges; (4) Employment at the student's school. (C) No attorney who has
ever represented the local board of education or District may serve as a Hearing
Officer or member of a Hearing Panel. (D) Any session at which the Hearing
Officer or Hearing Panel deliberates after the Hearing that is closed to the public
shall also be closed to any individual not serving as a Hearing Officer or member
of the Hearing Panel.
Section 2 is the most significant provision in guaranteeing a decision-maker free from the
appearance of bias. By limiting the hearing's decision-maker to an individual with no prior official
function in the student's case, the provision brings the pool of available decision-makers within
constitutionally tolerable bounds, guaranteeing that decision-makers will be beyond the
appearance of bias. However, the provision remains flexible enough to allow members of the board
of education to serve as adjudicators, so long as they do not violate one of the disqualifying
limitations. In this way, the provision does not make the adjudication process unduly burdensome
for districts because it does not affirmatively require them to look outside the confines of the local
board of education for selecting truly impartial decision-makers. 286 Necessarily, these limitations
will also per se exclude certain individuals from qualifying as a hearing officer regardless of actual
bias, such as a student's principal, a superintendent who has recommended disciplinary charges to
the board of education, or any other administrators who have been involved in investigating the
student's conduct. Thus, the provision ensures a constitutionally appropriate separation of
investigative and adjudicative functions employed in other administrative settings. 287
Section 3 should read:
Section 3: Standard of Review at Local Board Hearing and Judicial Review of
Appeal:(A) The decision of the Hearing Officer or Hearing Panel shall be based on
a de novo review of the factual record developed at the Hearing without regard to
any prior hearings or meetings. (B) A decision issued by the Hearing Officer or
This Section also might include additional procedures that may be constitutionally required such as a right for the
student to have counsel present and to confront and cross-examine accusers and witnesses that are beyond the scope
of this Note. See supra note 17.
286 Because most members of local boards of education are unpaid, the flexibility in this provision also refrains from
imposing substantial costs on a District in that they may use one or more of their own board members to adjudicate
285

the hearing as long as they otherwise qualify under Section 2's other requirements.
287 See supra Part IV.
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Hearing Panel under Section 1 of this Title may be appealed within 21 days of
issuance to the County Trial Court in which the District sits. (C) The Court shall
review the appeal based on the factual record developed at the Hearing. (D) A
Court's ruling on the appeal allowed by this Section is final.
Section 3 ensures that a student is afforded judicial review over a local board of education
ruling. This Section maintains the flexibility inherent in this model legislation by allowing the
factual record developed below at the disciplinary hearing to serve as the basis for the trial court's
appeal, thus preventing the re-litigation of disciplinary matters and retaining judicial efficiency.
The higher standards of impartiality this model legislation requires will ensure that a factual record
is developed in full fairness at the administrative level. It is important to note, however, that this
deference may not be preferential in states that do not allow the presence of counsel or the
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses at the discipline hearing because in the absence
of those safeguards, it is unlikely that a full factual record will have been developed.2 8 8 In such
cases, this Note would propose that a reviewing trial court be required to conduct a de novo
evidentiary hearing in lieu of a deferential appeal.
States that do not have a requirement for individuals who may serve as impartial decisionmakers should adopt the above legislation in full. States that have already adopted legislation
permitting the selection of an independent hearing officer need only amend those provisions to
affirmatively require the utilization of hearing officers, though those states should provide for de
novo review at the disciplinary hearing and judicial review of possible appeal. In certain
circumstances, those states may also elect to scale back the selection requirements of the individual
who will constitute an "independent hearing officer" to ease districts' transition from an optional
provision to an affirmative requirement while still maintaining minimum impartiality safeguards.
States already affirmatively requiring the use of independent hearing officers should further
amend those provisions to ensure that none of those hearing officers have served disciplinary roles
in the District, consistent with Section 2 above. States providing a pool of administrative law
judges or officers from which school districts can hire their hearing officers do not face the
constitutional problems inherent in states who leave the practice open to local boards of education.
Those states may choose to continue their constitutionally sound practices, though the strength of
the provisions above include flexibility for the selection of uninvolved board of education
members as hearing officers that is not available to districts in states with an administrative law
judge regime. In short, this Note argues that the Fourteenth Amendment requires greater due
process protections from state legislatures for students facing long-term discipline by providing a
decision-maker free from the appearance of bias. The model legislation presented above provides
a beneficial starting point for doing so.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The school landscape has changed dramatically since Goss v. Lopez was decided in 1975.
Though great strides have been made in due process protections across many adjudicative contexts,
students facing long-term discipline are still left with a mismatched tapestry of procedural rights
that desperately require uniformity and adaptation to the norms of the modem public educational
setting. 2 89 Federal, state, and local governments and federal and state courts have adapted with
288
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great flexibility and speed to the due process needs of certain classes of students by developing
statutory regimes for servicing students with disabilities, providing education for non-native
students, and ensuring all American children receive a public education regardless of legal
status. 290
The next horizon in education may properly be viewed as the heightened provision of
constitutional safeguards for students facing disciplinary consequences that, according to abundant
research, have the overwhelming power to end students' educational careers and channel them
toward the criminal justice system. 29 1 This goal calls for strong procedural safeguards, to include
impartial adjudicators beyond the appearance of impropriety or bias that is present in many school
discipline settings with unfortunate persistence. In spite of the presence of many skilled and caring
educators who would nobly do their utmost to serve as impartial adjudicators and would most
likely succeed in doing so, the consequences at stake for students facing school exclusion require
a heightened standard, akin to comparable administrative settings, to comport with the minimum
of procedural due process. A best practices approach is simply not enough for our students, nor
are thin protections that allow the specter of bias to linger. Because our students deserve justice to
perform "its highest function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." 2 9 2
The stakes for our students are simply too high for anything less.

See, e.g., Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et. seq.; Equal Educational Opportunities
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et. seq.; Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030
(7th Cir. 1987).
291 See supra, notes 35, 38,
40.
292 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
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